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Summary  findings
Curretit issues in banking policy range from the need to  Theoreticians note that banking increasingly displays
construct basic institutions aTnd  incentive structures in  network characteristics that, on the one hand, may call
transition econonmies  - to the challenges posed by the  for corrective action but that, on the other, make policy
increasingly complex  interactions involved in  intervention  ineffective or counterproductive.  For one
contcnporary  banking.  thing, networks are susceptible to externalities,
FHonohan  and Vittas outline the basic regulatory  redundancy (ensuring that flows cannot be obstricted  by
tramework needed to reduce bank failures. Without  blocking just one path), and a tendency to adapt to
measures that ensure risk diversification and adequate  disturbances in a complex manner.  Regulation is
capital reserves, for example, you get bank failures, as  justified, but the complexity of the network makes
recent experience shows.  successful interventions hard to design.
Dissatisfactioni  witlh  the diminishing effectiveness of  Supervision has a role, and Honohan and Vittas
posrmar banking regulation led to substantial  outline the basic regulatory measures needed. But the
deregulation. Betore adjusting to deregulation, bankers  blurring of boundaries between banking and the rest of
seemed vulnerable to a contagious euphoria, often  the financial network has placed an upper bound on the
manifested in overlending to property developers. Given  effectiveness of supervision. So, a degree of modesty is
the historic recurrence of carbon-copy banking failures,  appropriate in designing banking policy. We have to put
cLearly  private  ecarning  will not end all bank failure. And  up with bank failures (mitigated by deposit insurance to
the disappointing performance of both regulated and  protect small savers) but, they argue, partly because of
unregulated tinancial sectors leaves a vacuum that  network redundancy, the social cost of bank failure is not
theorcticians have beeni  trving ro fill.  as high as is sometimes thought.
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5  ConclusionINTRODUCTION
The interdependence of banks and governments, the inexorable sequence of banking booms and busts, and
the prevalence of regulatory controls all have a centuries-long history. Developing and transition economies
are confronted with the need for liberalization at  a time when deregulation in the market economies has
presaged costly  bank  failures.  At  the  same time,  although there  is  little reason  to  believe that  the
unregulated financial system is always for the best, the growing complexity of the world financial system
begins to militate against successful policy activism.
A review of banking policy issues must therefore necessarily cover a broad canvas. For this paper we have
selected three major areas of current concern:
the need to establish basic mechanisms and incentive structures in transition economies,
and  in  some of the poorest developing countries whose existing  systems have  proved
dysfunctional;
the successive waves of bank failure which have affected both developing and  industrial
countries, especially since deregulation;
the  challenge of designing policy for  soundness, effectiveness and  fairness of banking
systems in what has become an increasingly complex set of interacting networks.
Though each is treated  rather  differently in the paper, the three  areas are not unrelated. It  is not only
transition economies or the poorest developing countries which lack some elements of what we describe in
Section 1 as the indispensable institutional framework (IIF) for ownership and control in banking required
for even minimally adequate performance. The IIF involves clarifying the distinct goals of the fiscal and
monetary authority,  and  of the bank and  its  borrowers, as well  as avoiding unnecessary obstacles to
enforceability of financial contracts. We provide extended examples here from two recent cases of financial
systems that experienced periods of difficulty: the CFA franc zone in Africa and the former Soviet Central
Asia.
A regulatory and  ownership framework satisfy,ing  these minimal requirements and going beyond it co-
evolved  with  early  banking  systems  in  industrial  countries.  But  by  the  middle  of  this  century  the
paraphernalia of regulation, both prudential and substantive, had gone far beyond this minimum. Excessive
regulation, not only throughout the developing and planned economies, but also in the industrial world, had
transferred too many powers to regulators and governments, restricted the pool of potential bank owners,
distorted and muddied incentives, and degraded banking skills. Besides, even before the wave of pro-market
ideology  of the 1980s, technological developments were making it easier for the financial system to by-pass
much of the regulation.
But  the fashion  and  pressures  for  liberalization have been  followed by  a  widespread increase  in the
incidence of bank failures. What went wrong? Section 2 examines the historical experience. Although bad
policies, bad banking and bad luck each had a part to play in the recent spate of bank failures, suggesting
the existence of a  learning curve that may imply fewer banking failures in the future, the analysis also
highlights the strong pressures to assume excessive risks notably in waves of euphoria associated with
1property  booms  (especially  in  industrial  countries)  or  in  concentrated or  self-lending (especially  in
developing  world).
In seeking policy solutions for this more sophisticated environment, it is useful to recognize the network
characteristics which are  central to  the functioning of banking systems and  of financial systems more
generally. This  is the theme of  Section 3, which  shows how  network aspects  of  various types  are  a
recurrent theme of the recent theoretical literature. Networks tend to have three noteworthy characteristics:
they are prone to externalities; they are robust to partial failure, and offer multiple alternative paths if one
is blocked; and their complexity is such that intervening in one area will typically produce far-reaching and
hard-to-predict  effects.  The  three  considerations  pull  policy  design  in  opposite  directions:  although
networks are not fragile, the pervasive externalities do  call for  intervention, but the complexity makes
successful intervention hard to design.
Section 4 draws  some policy conclusions from these theoretical and empirical perspectives. While the
modern banking system needs a stronger financial constitution than would be provided by simply the IIF,
both  practical  experience  and  the  network  considerations  suggest  caution  in  moving  towards  over-
elaboration of control measures, including  over-complicated rules for time-varying capital requirements and
measures that give bankers substantial franchise value to discourage excessive risk-taking. Besides, with
the continued trend toward blurring of boundaries between banking and other financial institutions, and the
limited capacity of supervision, it will never be possible to eliminate bank failures. Inasmuch as the social
costs of bank failure can be exaggerated, a certain incidence  of failure should be regarded as acceptable.
So far as developmental and fairness-oriented policies are concerned, network considerations suggest, on
the one hand, that correcting problems of this type can be very desirable but, on the other hand, that such
measures can often be ineffective or counterproductive. These issues are  illustrated by  the debate over
universal banking.
21  BASIC DISTORTIONS OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL
1.1  The Indispensable Institutional Framework
The exact degree and nature of the optimal constraints on bank ownership rights, and the best design for
regulatory structures, is not a simple matter for a sophisticated financial system. But for economies which
have difficulty in reaching even a basic level of adequate financial sector performance it seems possible (at
the risk of some reductionism) to define the major pre-requisites of the minimally adequate or indispensable
institutional framework (IIF). Underlying the idea of such a framework is the attempt to avoid the most
glaring misalignments of private incentives  with the public good.
The proposed IIF has three elements, relating respectively to central banking, banks and the contractual
framework. Central banks should have the political and operational autonomy to influence interest rate and
credit conditions with a  view to protecting the value of the currency and the viability of banking and in
particular  should not be constrained to fund open-ended fiscal deficits. Such  autonomy can be  sought
through legislation, but will have little real effect unless buttressed by political tradition and the force of
public opinion, or by external pressures such as those often conveyed through the conditionality associated
with IMF balance of payment support. Banks should have ownership and control structures which ensure
that they are primarily autonomous profit centers, rather than responding passively to the demands of their
borrowers or of the government. Regulatory intervention in their activities should be chiefly directed to
ensuring solvent and safe and  fair operation, and  regulations should certainly not undermine solvency.
Finally, governments must try to avoid legislative or administrative action which stands in the way of the
basic functioning and enforceability of financial contracts.
In this view, most of the issues that pre-occupy the analysts of sophisticated banking systems are inherently
of secondary importance. Issues such as the desirability of risk-weighting for capital requirements, bank
privatization, the pros and cons of deposit insurance, and the relative merits of bank-by-bank credit ceilings
and open market operations, are irrelevant if an IIF is not in place.  Other  important aspects,  such as
governance within banks --the agency problems of managers vis-a-vis shareholders-- are also important but
derive their  logic essentially from the  overall incentive framework.  The kind of financial  constitution
discussed by Vittas (1 992c) and to which we return later, can be seen as an elaboration and development of
the IlF.'
Although the list of requirements of the IIF is a brief one, it is nuanced. A theme on which we would like to
insist is that slogans are inadequate here. Privatization and central bank independence  in particular are two
slogans whose inadequacy has been exposed by instances in which the forrms  have been adopted, without
the intended substance.
IThus, for example, information disclosure and prudential supervision  are  important elements of an  ideal
regulatory  framework.  However,  countries  with underdeveloped  accounting  and auditing standards  will suffer  from
the  poor quality of  available financial information. Similarly, effective financial supervision requires the
deployment  of highly skilled and experienced  examiners  with well defined  and significant  powers  of intervention,
features  that are likely  to be absent in most developing  countries.  What the IIF implies for countries suffering  from
such gaps is that banks responding  to the incentives  of their owners  would tend to extend credit for short-term,
self-liquidating  projects  and against realizable  collateral  security.
3Different types  of banking  malaise are  characteristically associated with  the absence  of each of these
elements. Experience in  Latin America shows, for  example, that  a  lack of  central  banking autonomy
typically results in chronic inflation which shrinks the domestic financial market: even if commercial banks
operate as autonomous profit centers under such circumstances (and some have done in Argentina  and
Brazil), the financial system as a whole suffers because savers place their money in real assets or in foreign
financial markets. Alternatively, there are  many instances (e.g. Egypt,  Morocco and  Tunisia  in North
Africa  as  well  as  India,  Pakistan  and  Sri  Lanka  in  South  Asia)  in  which  absence  of  autonomous
commnercial  banks  in  an otherwise stable  financial system with  low inflation has  resulted  in endemic
insolvency as commercial banks are forced to lend to unprofitable firms and carry nonperforming loans on
their books.
But the best way to illustrate the importance of the IIF is by way of two highly negative examples of deep
failure. Let us describe, in stylized manner, the substantial failure, not of individual banks, but effectively
of entire banking structures, in two very different parts of the world - Former Soviet Central Asia and West
Africa. Underlying  the failures, we argue, are not only the undoubtedly severe shocks which buffeted these
regions, but also the failure, appearances notwithstanding, to have an IIF in place.
1.2  Financial  Vacuum in Central Asia
When Russia finally abolished the  Ruble zone in the latter  half of  1993, the financial systems  of the
peripheral zone members were in varying degrees of acute distress bordering on collapse. Even outlining
the complex and dramatic historical background to this situation would take us too far afield, so we limit
ourselves to describing the manner in which the elements of the IIF were not in place and how their absence
contributed to the financial crisis.2 Although the story was repeated, with variations, throughout most of the
FSU, we focus on the Central Asian Republics.
Autonomy  of central  banking
Tlhe  national central banks, which had been hastily constituted from the local offices of the former USSR
State  Bank,  were  far  from  being autonomous.  Like many other  central  banks,  even  where  formally
independent of the fiscal authority, the central banks were certainly not independent of fiscal pressures.3
Each of the Central Asian Republics had lost a  substantial fraction of their former fiscal resources as a
result of the break-up of the Soviet Union. Combined with other pressures, this caused the fiscal authorities
to turn to the central banks for credit, whether directly to the budget or to agriculture, or to state-owned
enterprises whose long-term viability had  been cast  in doubt by the change in relative  prices and  the
contraction  of demand from the  rest  of the  FSU.  Monetization of these  pressures  would  alone  have
contributed to high inflation (as it did in Russia itself), but there was more.
2It  should be noted that the inherited institutional  arrangements of these countries had not been altogether
inappropriate  or dysfunctional  for the planned  economy.
3In Kazakhstan  as in Russia,  the central bank was made independent  of the executive,  but under the authority  of
parliament. an  arrangement which, if  intended to  protect  the  integrity of  the  currency, proved to  be
counterproductive.  This is a good illustration  of the proposition  that legislative  independence  alone is not sufficient
to produce a central  bank which  will behave  autonomously  in an anti-inflationary  manner.
4For none of the central banks of the ruble zone (apart from the Central Bank of Russia) could have had any
responsibility for  the  integrity of the  currency. This  misallocation of  institutional responsibilities had
disastrous incentive effects. In a classic tragedy of the commons, each central bank extended ruble credit on
a massive scale, as none intemalized the inflation it was exporting.
It was inevitable that the currency union would collapse under the pressures of multiple central banks and,
in mid-1993, it did so, forcing the Central Asian countries to introduce their own currencies in chaotic
circumstances, and in a situation where the new central banks had established no anti-inflation credibilitv.4
Partly as a result of the political pressures, Central Asian central banks persisted for some time in irrational
interest rate structures. Not  only were real interest rates massively negative, but deposit rates  could be
higher than lending rates. Needless to say, the result was a deepening of the insolvency of banks, despite a
widening of margins on uncontrolled segments of the market.
Ownership and control of commercial banks
Nor was the commercial bank element of the IIF in place. For, instead of being operated as autonomous
profit-seeking institutions, the large banks saw themselves as serving their borrowing clients. Indeed, as
time progressed, many of these banks were "privatized" by being converted to joint-stock corporations and
issuing their shares, chiefly to their principal borrowers. 5 In most cases both banks and borrowers were
insolvent, though their official accounts did not proclaim this  situation. Under these circumstances, the
incentives for  owners and  management of the banks were not aligned to  social benefit. Reacting in a
predictable and even partly rational way, bankers' first priority was to secure enough of the under-priced
central bank  credit  for their own clients. While the flows of cheap credit  continued, new banks  were
established by the more energetic and well-placed manufacturing firms to act  as additional conduits for
these funds.
Even as high inflation eroded the real value of the uncollectible bank loan debts from the old regime, the
new waves of credit during 1992-94 were thus mostly to the same, insolvent borrowers. It would have been
relatively inexpensive  to recapitalize the banks, and start them on a sound financial basis in early 1992; by
1994 the financial deficiency of the banking system had ballooned out again to a significant fraction of
GDP. Indeed, the real stock of performing credit outstanding was much lower than had been the case before
1992.
To the extent that they operated outside the preferential credit regime, other new banks have been limited to
providing little more than corporate treasury and pay-ment  services to their owners and other customers.6 If
these new private banks also successfully compete for the business of the most mobile (and credit-worthy)
4Nominally  valued at parity  with the ruble, the Uzbek  Som-coupon  fell within a matter of wveeks  to R 0. 15.
5In  many cases these "privatized"  banks remained wholly  controlled  by managers who were part of the state
apparatus. The shareholders, drawn from employees and  borrowing customers, were paid  a  fixed annual
percentage  dividend, without  any expectation  of sharing in good  or bad profit outturns,  just as if they were long-
term depositors.
6As indeed  has been  happening  on a larger  scale in Russia.  cf Pohl and Claessens  (1994).
5borrowers,  the state-owned banks  can hardly avoid being caught  in a  downward spiral  of  worsening
competitive position and  an  increasingly adverse loan-loss  experience. Such  a  Darwinian  process  of
evolution in the banking system may carry heavy costs on the way, not least the fact that a proliferation of
new banks makes it difficult for depositors to discriminate between sound and unsound, and offers plenty of
opportunities for incompetent or unscrupulous entrants.'
Enforcement of contracts
The final element of the IIF  relates to enforcement of financial contracts,  and here too the post-Soviet
regimes have been weak. For one thing there has been the disruption of inter-republican payments.
Trade in intermediate goods between firms in what had been different regions of the Soviet Union and were
now separate countries had been an integral part of the economic structure. Settlement of these transactions
had involved the integrated banking and central banking system in a very centralized manner which was no
longer available. Although the viability of many of their former customers was seriouslv in question, many
enterprises, faced with no alternative market, agreed to ship without assurance of payments, and substantial
arrears were accumulated. Without any adequate enforcement of financial contracts in the system, the risk
that one might be delivering goods to an insolvent enterprise was greatly  increased.  The absence of a
means of settlement for interrepublican transactions in the last eighteen months of the ruble zone, and the
absence of a network of trusted banking correspondents were contributory factors - and these too can be
seen as stemming from a failure of contract enforcement.
Similar pressures resulted in the accumulation of domestic arrears, both inter-enterprise and on the part of
the governments. To what  extent these reflected insolvency, and  to  what  extent the  emergence of an
insouciant attitude to paying one' bills remains unclear.
Attempts to meet the problem of inter-enterprise arrears  bv means of occasional multilateral netting and
settlement exercises, oiled by provision of low-cost central bank credit, were palliatives that merely fueled
inflation.
1.3  A Fatally Rigid Institutional Arrangement: the Franc Zone
The sequence of events leading to financial sector failure in the franc zone countries of West and Central
Africa  are  strikingly different,  but  the  failure  is  almost  as  severe,  and  also  reflects  an  inadequate
institutional framework. In sharp contrast to the FSU, the underlying economic philosophy of the franc
zone arrangements is that of an open and competitive market. Although established at  independence, and
not drastically altered since then, 9 the institutional arrangements of the franc zone are strikingly modem in
7So  far, depositors  in Central Asia have lost more  through negative  real interest rates. and through difficulties  in
accessing  their deposits,  that in outright  bank failure.
8Often seen  as merely  a technical  problem  of inadequate  paper procedures,  the real social  costs of this problem  lay
both in the underlying  real transactions,  both those which  took  place but shouldn't  have and those which didn't but
should  have.  Much of the resulting  arrears reflects  economically  wasteful  production.
9Though  the importance  of the Africanisation  reforms  of 1973  are stressed  by some.
6appearance. In particular there have been multinational central banks"  (which are thus independent of any
one national government), an open capital account, widespread presence of foreign-owned banks and the
lowest inflation rates in Africa. From some points of view the regime has looked like a  precursor to the
proposed European Monetary  Union with its single currency, its freedom of capital movements and  its
multinational central bank. Nevertheless, we argue that it has not had an IIF.
For many years economic performance of the franc zone countries appeared to justify the high expectations
which had been placed in the arrangements. In the end, however, the very rules on which the franc zone was
built proved to be the rock on which it foundered, bringing the functioning of the banking system almost to
a halt in several of the countries. By 1993 all of the countries in the zone were in deep recession. A parallel
market in the CFA franc had opened up, and not only were capital movements now blocked, but effecting
current international payments had become difficult. A majority of the banks had failed, though some had
been recapitalized or rescued in one form or another. Depositors in many banks had gone without access to
their funds for years.  The interbank market was barely operating. The central banks were close to being
unable to cover their operating expenses.
Ownership and control of the banks
Given prolonged and ultimately accurate speculation of a major devaluation, 1'  it is easy to  see why the
banking systems should have ended up in an illiquid position. But there was more to it than that. For years
the governments in several member states had directly or indirectly pushed the banks into lending to state-
owned enterprises, or to  regional and political groupings, or  simply to  some of the governments' own
suppliers who had not been paid. Over the years, the share of borrowers who couldn't or wouldn't repay,
including those who took a politically-driven loan to be equivalent to a grant, grew.
Why did these banks, operating after all in a market environment, agree to make these loans? How did they
attract  resources to make such onlending? Here is where the ambiguity of ownership and control rights
becomes central, and the lack of an IIF becomes evident. For the role and mission of the major banks was
far from clear. Most were joint ventures between the national governments and one of four major French-
based banks; sometimes the government was the majority shareholder, sometimes not. In either case, the
key senior management was provided by French nationals seconded from the parent banks in France. But
the  objective of  the  parent  banks  is  likely to  have  been  complicated by  wider  issues  than  narrow
profitability  (such  as  serving the  commercial interests of their  French customers).  Although formally
autonomous,  the  operations  of  these  joint-venture  banks  were  highly  constrained  by  political
considerations.  12
Qualified autonomy of the central banks
1 0There  are two separate  unions,  comprising  six and seven  countries  respectively,  and with central  banks located  in
Cameroon  and Senegal.
I  The CFA franc  was devalued  bv 50 per cent in January 1994,  after almost  half a century  of stability.
12The same was true a fortiori for the wholly  government-owned  development  banks;  but that is a standard story,
applicable  to scores  of countries.
7Nor were the banks constrained by  lack of loanable resources. Though inhibited from much lending to
governments, the two regional central banks were free to refinance lending through the banking system, and
they effectively provided the necessary resources. So although the central banks were apparently freed by
statute from any fiscal pressure, they nevertheless succumbed  to indirect pressure to lend through banks for
relief of fiscal needs. Systematically it proved to be the insolvent banks that had relied most on the central
banks for refinancing. Even the central banks' self interest in preserving the quality of their own balance
sheet (in order to ensure adequate revenue to meet their not insubstantial operational expenses) was not
sufficient to limit their lending to doubtful banks. For (at least in the Western part of the zone) the statutory
arrangements were understood to  provide the central  bank with a  government guarantee  of  lending to
banks. Thus was the circle completed and the apparently cautious rules built into the system subverted. The
central banks, nominally independent, acted as if they were agents of the fiscal authorities, refinancing
politically directed or government-inspired bank  lending that  could never be  repaid. The confusion of
ownership and control responsibilities  that resulted certainly implies that the central banking aspects of the
IIF were also absent.
Official payment arrears
Mention has already been made of the domestic payment arrears which several of the zone's governments
ran up, and which contributed to the illiquidity of the banking system. This degree of payment indiscipline
certainly violates the contract enforcement principle which is also part  of IIF, and  wvhich  was already
undermined  by the difficulties of obtaining  judicial judgments in the case of loan delinquencies.
The IIF was thus achieved neither in respect of commercial or central banks, nor in respect of contract
enforcement. The low level of deposit mobilization - often attributed to the open capital market in the zone -
can be seen as no coincidence. Against this institutional background, the banking system proved unable to
cope with the severe macroeconomic shocks that are endemic in Africa.
Excessive institutional rigidity
The rigidity of the institutional framework established for monetary and banking arrangements in the franc
zone lulled policy-makers into a false sense of security. These rules did not guarantee an IIF, and indeed the
very rigidity of the rules induced an evolution of banking practice which violated the IIF by subordinating
both commercial and central banking to fiscal pressures.
1.4  Lessons of Deep Failure
The relation between government and banks needs to be governed by  an institutional design that assigns
responsibility in a manner which will have some hope of surviving political pressures and macroeconomic
shocks. Any attempt to transplant a full-fledged institutional model on a society which is emerging from the
planned  regime,  or  from  deep  financial  sector  failure  emanating  from  some  other  cause  such  as
hyperinflation is unlikely to  be wholly  successful. If  the essential features  of the  IIF  are  lost  in  the
transplant, as happened in the franc zone, then not only will the system underperform, but it is prone to
massive failure. It is probably a bit harsh to judge the FSU case in these terms: the macroeconomic and
structural shocks undergone by these countries would have severely  tested any banking system.
Nevertheless, in neither case did the banks or the central banks have an ownership and control structure
which provided incentives to prevent the diversion of massive volumes of loanable funds into lost causes.
Because  banks  were  not  autonomous  profit  seeking  entities, free  of  commitments  to  over-indebted
shareholders, the monetarv expansion left the banks with a  blocked portfolio, suspicious depositors, and
8little access to credit by the few viable borrowers who must represent these countries' economic future. In
both cases, financial indiscipline led by governments who declined to pay their bills on time exacerbated the
crisis.
Reform measures are either already in place or planned in each of these countries. Lessons may have been
learnt. The challenge of substantial structural transformation of the real economy remains in Central Asia;
that of increasing productivity and gro%vth  still faces West and Central Africa.
Although the examples are extreme and the lessons to be learnt may seem simple, there are echoes of these
cases in the stories  of many other developing country  experiences over the  past  quarter  centurv.  The
messages have a wide relevance. With the current vogue for updating central bank and commercial banking
legislation in developing countries, it is important to recall that the IIF is not just a set of rules to be enacted
into legislation and then ignored.
92.  DEREGULATION  AND LIBERALIZATION:  WHAT  WENT  WRONG?
The specification of optimal banking regulation clearly goes beyond the basic precepts of the IIF discussed
in the previous  section. Furthermore, the adequacy of the generally liberal, albeit  nuanced, framework
outlined above may be called into question when one considers the history of banking crises that has been
associated with liberalization. This section reviews that experience.
Most developed and developing countries suffered from banking problems of one sort or another during the
past twenty years.  In some countries, the problems were manifested in bank failures  and even systemic
crises. In these cases, the authorities were often compelled to intervene to rescue failing banks and prevent
a collapse of the banking system. Such interventions proved costly and raised questions about the scope and
impact of deregulation. In other countries, banking problems were more endemic in nature and tended to be
hidden by the failure to make adequate provisions for nonperforming loans. In the latter countries, banks
tended to be state-owned and continued to operate even though they were technically insolvent. Ironically,
such banks were often perceived as highly profitable and were required to pay  sizable profit taxes. But
eventually  they  were  compelled to  recognize their  loan  losses and  required  capital  injections. Thus,
intervention costs were high even in countries that did not deregulate and reform their banking systems.
The direct costs of intervention are only part of the economic costs suffered from banking systems that are
prone to epidemic or endemic crises. Perhaps a  much bigger problem derives from the misallocation of
resources that  malfunctioning banking systems may cause. The challenge for the authorities  is to help
create  systems that  will avoid the excesses and  abuses of both heavily and  lightly regulated markets.
Devising and applying consistently an optimal system of regulation is not an easy task as is demonstrated
by the recent experience of banking systems in some highly developed countries.
2.1  The regulatory process
It is now widely accepted that the regulatory process is an endogenous response to changes in the financial
system, especially to  financial crises  and to  real or perceived problems in the functioning of financial
systems. The panoply of regulations that was imposed on banks in the aftermath of the Great Depression
was motivated by the bank panics and failures that occurred in the 1  930s after a period of euphoric growth
and overexpansion. And the deregulation that started to occur in the late 1950s and accelerated sharply in
the  1970s and  1980s was a  response to the real or perceived costs  of regulation and to  the changing
environment within which banks operated.
In the  1950s and  1960s, most developed countries had heavily regulated banking markets. Except  for
Germanic countries, commercial banks  in  most countries were prevented from engaging in  long-term
lending and  investment banking.  Banking markets  were  heavily segmented. Many  countries  imposed
geographic restrictions on all or some of their financial institutions. Branching controls discouraged the
expansion  of branch  networks  and  interest rate  controls  (either government imposed or  operated  by
officially sponsored cartels) limited the ability of banks to engage in price  competition. Credit ceilings
restricted the expansion of credit, while selective credit controls favored the provision of credit to priority
sectors, often by government-owned or sponsored institutions. Domestic controls were supplemented by
strict foreign exchange controls. There were restrictions on foreign bank entry as well as on domestic entrv
and exit, including restrictions on mergers. There were also controls that repressed the development of
10securities markets and discouraged nondeposit institutions as well as nonfinancial companies to compete
with banks and other deposit institutions.
In developing countries, banking and financial markets were, and still are, more heavily regulated than in
developed countries. Credit ceilings and interest rate controls were generally more binding, directed credit
programns  more pervasive, and state intervention more extensive. The markets of most developing countries
were dominated by state-owned commercial and development banks. Moreover, in many countries, even
individual lending decisions were controlled as loans above a certain size required the prior authorization of
the  central  bank  or  ministry  of planning. Many  of  the  loans were granted  to  state-owned industrial
companies at heavily subsidized rates and with a poor repayment record. In former communist countries,
banks  were operating as  mere  disbursing agents for  credit  allocations already  decided by  other  state
entities.
The basic  motivation of these  controls was to  create stable banking systems that  would  help finance
industrial  and  other  sectors  deemed to  have  higher econormic priority.  It  is  fair  to  say  that,  in  most
developed and a  small number of developing countries, the controls had little negative effect in the first
fifteen years after the end of the war and may even have had a positive effect on the effort for economic
reconstruction and recovery. The controlled markets may have facilitated the financing of heavy industries
and capital-intensive infrastructure projects that were essential for economic recovery, especially in the
countries that suffered  heavy destruction of their productive capacity during the war.  By  discouraging
lending for consumption purposes and especially for speculative real estate development, the controls may
also have contributed to financial stability. Some of the controls, such as credit ceilings and interest rate
controls,  prevented  banks  from  competing aggressively  for  loans  or  deposits  and  may  thus  have
strengthened prudent banking practices. In the regulated and competitively  subdued financial systems of the
1950s and 1960s, banks and other financial institutions were able to operate with high margins that ensured
respectable profits and returns on equity.
But the authorities, at least in the more advanced countries, were concerned about the stifling effect of all
these controls on competition and innovation and about their long-term impact on efficiency. A main policy
issue also related to the coverage of controls. As new institutions were created to fill gaps in the provision
of financial services, especially finance companies that specialized in providing real estate  development
finance and consumer credit,'3 the authorities were faced with the dilemma of expanding the coverage of
controls to the  new institutions and thus  stifling both  institutional and  product  innovation or allowing
unregulated  institutions14 to  coexist  and  compete with  tightly  regulated  ones.  The  latter  stimulated
innovation and competition but undermined  the effectiveness of controls and also had an adverse effect on
the relative competitive position of the institutions that were subject to controls.
13Some  of these finance companies  were established  by commercial  banks in an attempt to bypass the restrictive
regulations.
14To be sure, these institutions,  which included  finance companies  and other secondary  banks and in some cases
foreign banks were not unregulated  institutions  in the full sense  of the term but they were not subject  to the full
panoply of controls  as the main commercial  banks  in different  countries.
11Although the process of deregulation was gradual and incremental, it did encompass most types of controls,
from branching  and geographic restrictions to  institutional demarcation lines and to  credit ceilings and
interest rate controls. 
15 The deregulation process was interrupted in the mid to late 1970s as a result of the
aftereffects of the oil crisis, but it resumed in the 1980s when its main focus was the removal of structural
controls. Exchange controls were abolished. Domestic markets were opened to  foreign competition and
domestic banks were allowed to expand in overseas markets. Banks were
authorized to operate as universal banks. Stock exchanges were reformed and their membership opened to
banks and other institutions. Banks and insurance companies were allowed to join forces in marketing and
distribution.16  The restrictions that discouraged the development of bond and commercial paper markets
were  removed  in  country  after  country.  The  deregulation  process  was  spurred  bv  advances  in
telecommunications and information technology that made easier the bypassing of continuing restrictions
through overseas markets or through new institutions such as money market mutual funds.
In developing countries, the imposition of strict credit ceilings and other controls prevented banks  from
engaging in imprudent and highly cyclical asset-based finance. Thus, the heavily regulated banking systems
of developing countries were immune from epidemics of banking euphoria followed by banking crises. But
on the  other hand,  failure to  suspend interest accrual  on  nonperforming loans  and  to  make  adequate
provisions against  doubtful debts  resulted in  an  endemic situation of  technically insolvent banks  and
persistent misallocation of economic resources, with detrimental effects to long-term growth.
Directed credit  programs  were a  major tool of development policy in both  developed and  developing
countnes in the 1960s and 1970s. Such programs were used to provide finance at preferential termns  to high
priority industry, exports, small enterprises, and rural and housing credit. During the 1  980s, the realization
that most of these programs had resulted in distorted incentives among both lenders and borrowers led to a
reconsideration of their rationale and effectiveness. The experience of most countries around the  world
showed that directed credit programs stimulated capital intensive projects, suffered from abuse and misuse
of preferential funds for nonpriority purposes,  increased the cost of funds to nonpreferential borrowers,
involved a decline in financial discipline that resulted in low repayment rates, and contributed to a swelling
of budget deficits.
Japan and Korea were probably the only notable exceptions. Their experience suggests that the success of
directed credit programs depends on good design and effective implementation (Calomiris and Himmelberg,
1995; Vittas and Cho, 1995). But in most developing countries few, if any, of the essential conditions for
effective credit programs were met.  Dissatisfaction with the experience of direct controls became verv
15Somewhat  ironically,  the first country  to remove  controls  was Germany,  which had in the late 1950s and early
1960s the fewer and less binding controls. But its example was followed by other countries in Europe and
elsewhere.
However,  banks  and insurance  companies  have not been  allowed  to mnerge  fully  their accounts  and operations.
17As  summarized  in Vittas and Cho (1995),  well designed  credit  programs  must be small in size. narrowly  focused
and of limited duration. they should involve  a low subsidy.  be financed  with long-term  resources;  should promote
industrialization  and exports; and should form part of a  broader credible vision of economic development,
promoting  growth  with equity,  and involving  a long-term  strategy  to develop  a sound  financial system  operating  on
economic criteria. Good implementation requires channelling policy-based loans through well  capitalized,
12pervasive and led to a process of deregulation in most developing countries that involved the elimination of
directed credit programs, removal of interest rate controls and replacement of credit ceilings with indirect
methods  of  monetary  and  credit  control.  The  removal  of  direct  controls  was  accompanied  by  a
strengthening of  prudential  regulation  and  supervision  and  bv  a  privatization  of  state-owned banks,
although progress in these two areas varied considerably across countries.
2.2  Bank failures
Deregulation was prompted in both developed and developing countries by  concerns about  the stifling
effect of direct controls on innovation and efficiencv and about their growing ineffectiveness in the face of
technological and institutional changes. But  deregulation did lead to  unwise expansion of credit, to  ill-
conceived and badly managed diversification into nonbanking markets, and to abuses of lending to related
parties. In developed countries, the main problem seemed to be excessive lending for property development.
while in developing countries the main problem was an excess in insider lending.
The early phase
The first significant crisis of the 1970s was the secondary bank crisis in the United Kingdom in the early
1970s.  This  involved a  group  of  relatively small, undercapitalized and  poorly  supervised  banks  that
engaged in excessive lending in real estate development.  However, the large commercial banks also suffered
big losses and in fact one of the biggest banks had to issue a denial that it was about to fail.  18
Far  more important problems occurred in the Netherlands. Germany and Spain in the  late  1970s. The
problems in the Netherlands and Germnany  were related to the large increase in international interest rates
following the sudden change in the policies of the Federal Reserve in the US and the collapse of the local
property markets. Thus, in the Netherlands all mortgage banks failed in the late  1970s. Although they were
supposed to borrow long and lend long, they suffered from their residual exposure to interest rate risk and
from credit losses. The Dutch mortgage banks were absorbed either by  the large universal banks or by
insurance companies. In Germany, most mortgage banks had- already been taken over by  the universal
banks (including the Landesbanks). Thus, there were no bank failures as such, although most universal
administratively  capable and autonomous  financial institutions as well as use of clear. objective and  easily
monitored criteria with  detailed project appraisals, close supervision of  disbursement, and  monitoring of
performance and  repayment records. And  finally they  should be  supported bv  effective mechanisms for
communication  and consultation  between  the public  and private  sectors, including  the collection  and dissemination
of basic market information.  However,  credit programs  have proved  difficult  to remove  even in Japan and Korea.
They have tended to outlive their usefulness  and, especially  in Korea, they have left a legacy of nonperforming
loans.
i8In  the mid-1970s, the failure of Herstatt, a  small German bank specializing in trade  finance, attracted
considerable attention. This was because of the fear of possible domino effects in the international foreign
exchange  market  and a disruption  of international  payments.  but once the liquidity  problems  created by its failure
were addressed,  the Herstatt incident had little impact. It was in some respects similar to the recent failure of
Barings,  causing  a reconsideration  of internal  control  systems  but without  any systemic  crisis.
13banks suffered huge losses and Commerzbank (the third largest German bank) was forced to replace the
whole of its management board.  19
A much more interesting case was that of Spain. Banks in Spain have long had extensive equity stakes in
industrial  and  commercial companies, but most of these holdings were dormant with  very  little bank
involvement in corporate management and a generally poor performance by both banks and industry. The
situation changed in the  1970s with the amalgamation of commercial and industrial banks (permitted in
1974). Some banking groups started to take a more active interest in industrial and commercial companies
and to manage them more actively with a view to generating additional revenues and financial power for the
bankers that  controlled the banks.  A  case  in point was that  of the  Rumasa  Group,  which grew  at  a
spectacular  rate  in  the  1970s on  the  basis  of complicated and  very  obscure  links  between different
companies in the group (Caminal et al.,  1990). In this respect, Spain (alongside other Southern European
countries) was more like developing countries in Latin America and East Asia rather than other OECD
countries.
The later phase
Banking crises in the  1980s were more numerous and more serious. Many international commercial banks
suffered huge losses when the LDC debt crisis erupted as developing countries suspended the servicing of
their debts. But loan renegotiation and rescheduling as well as gradual write-offs and loan loss provisioning
averted  failures  of  large  commercial  banks.  The  crisis  of  the  savings  and  loan  associations  (thrift
institutions that specialized in housing finance) proved more difficult to contain (Kane, 1985, 1989; White,
1991). These institutions suffered two crises: one in the early 1980s resulting from their heavy interest rate
mismatch caused by funding 30-year fixed-rate mortgages with short term deposits. and the second in the
mid-1980s that  resulted from granting to the insolvent thrifts expanded powers to engage in commercial
lending, real  estate  development and  other activities that  were  substantially  more  riskv  than  housing
finance. The second savings and loan crisis culminated in the insolvency  of their deposit insurance fund, a
massive intervention by the authorities, and a loss to US taxpayers of the order of US 150 billion dollars in
present value terms, equivalent to 3% of GNP. This is probably the largest loss from banking failures in
absolute dollar terms, though not in relation to national income.
The thrift crisis was particularly acute in oil producing states, such as Texas, where real estate prices were
correlated with energy prices. The collapse of oil prices in the mid-1980s also had a deleterious effect on
commercial banks. A banking crisis caused by falling real estate prices affected first oil-producing states
but then spread to North-Eastern and South-Western states. An unprecedented number of banks  failed,
including some large banks. Many of these were rescued by merging with other banks, although some large
banks could not avoid closure. The Bank of New England was the largest bank that was forced to close
down. Even Bank of America (in the mid-  1980s) and Citibank (in the late 1980s) came close to failure and
had to take corrective measures that were effectively dictated by supervisory authorities. Most failed banks
had  huge exposures  in  real  estate  related  lending  and  had  experienced a  period  of  very  rapid  and
unsustainable growth prior to their failure.
19Commerzbank  was probably  technically  insolvent  at the time, having suffered  enormous paper losses from the
rise in interest rates.
14The  experience of  American  oil-producing states  was  repeated  in Norway.  Nearly  the  whole  of the
Norwegian banking sector was rescued and taken under state ownership following the collapse of the oil
price in 1986, the plummeting real estate prices, and the massive bankruptcies and credit losses suffered by
banks. The crisis in Norway was soon followed by  similar crises in Sweden and Finland, although the
circumstances and proximate causes were different. Swedish banks, and finance companies that borrowed
from them, had large exposures not only to domestic real estate but also to foreign property markets. Banks
in Finland were also adversely affected by the economic contraction of the former  Soviet Union and the
East Block more generally. In both Sweden and Finland, the authorities intervened to rescue several banks
and provided extensive liquidity support to the whole system. 20
Other countries did not experience the systemwide failures of Scandinavian countries but they did suffer
from banking problems that caused large losses for most banks and forced some banks to closure and\or
rescue by other banks. Many countries experienced a severe real estate cycle. The expansion phase of the
cycle was fueled by a large increase in bank and finance company credits. When the boom was followed by
the bust, banks in the United Kingdom, the United States, Japan, France, Australia, Canada,  Spain, and
even Switzerland were hit by losses mostly from the failure of property developers (Renaud,  1995), though
defaults by households on their mortgage and consumer loans also became a growing problem, especially
as many households found themselves with negative home equity. The effects of the real estate cycle were
compounded in most countries by the onset of economic recession in the early  1990s that  gave rise to
nonperforming loans to small and medium sized firms. During this period of upheaval and crisis, the only
two major countries that seemed to be little affected were Germany and the Netherlands, perhaps because
the memories and lessons of previous excesses were still fresh.21
During the 1980s, Canada experienced its first bank failures for over fifty years. In Switzerland, regional
and even cantonal savings banks  were rescued by merging with the  large  Swiss commercial banks. In
France, Credit Lyonnais was hit by very large losses in real estate, industrial lending and lending to failed
international ventures and was the object of a  massive rescue bv the French government. Other French
banks also suffered substantial losses from property lending.
The indications are that the unfolding Japanese banking crisis could prove to be exceptionally severe. So
far, there have been just  five failures since December 1994 - four credit cooperatives and one regional
bank. But these account for only a small fraction of the total nonperforming loans of the Japanese banking
and near-banking system, now unofficially estimated at nearly $600 billion, or about  12 per cent of GNP,
and mostly real estate related. Just whv Japanese banks have been so careless in their lending to finance
companies and property developers is unclear, considering how meticulous they have been in the past in
lending to industrial groups. One factor mav have been the huge deposit inflows which they experienced as
20The original cost of state intervention  in the three Nordic countries is estimated at 4.5 per cent of GNP in
Norway,  6.2 per cent in Sweden  and 14.7  per cent in Finland  (Koskenkyla,  1994;  Renaud. 1995),  though the long-
term cost is likely to be smaller because  of some loan recovery  and capital gains generated  in reprivatizing  the
banks.
21 TK  banks indulged  in excessive  property  lending  in the late 1980s  despite  their earlier and not too distant losses
in the early 1970s.  This, and the recurrent  crises of the 19th century,  suggest that institutional  memory  may be
limited to less than 10  years.
15many enterprises increased their  liquid assets  following capital  market  issues.  As  wvell  as  lacking an
effective crisis resolution mechanism, the Japanese system has suffered from poor disclosure and weak
supervision, especially of the smaller institutions, among whom the authorities have created moral hazard
by responding to the crisis with forbearance. At the macropolicy level the reaction to asset inflation was
one of benign neglect, similar to that observed in most other countries with soaring equity and property
prices.
Apart from imprudent lending, banks also suffered from fraudulent activities. In Greece, the Bank of Crete
collapsed amid allegations of extensive fraud and political entanglements. In Spain, Banesto, the largest
bank, failed and was taken over by a smaller bank (Banco Santander) when its management manipulated its
share price by improper dealings in the industrial shares held by the bank's holding corporation.
The biggest single banking fraud was the collapse of BCCI, an international bank with operations in dozens
of countries but  with obscure ownership and  manlagement  that  had  long engaged in illegal  activities,
including money laundering.
Developing countries
We have already described in some detail some of the most severe examples of failure in the developing
world. But the experiences of the franc zone and the Central Asian Republics are by no means unique.
The  first  developing country  to  suffer  from  a  large  and  widespread crisis  was  Chile.  The  Chilean
experience has many similarities with what happened in Spain,  although the crisis was deeper and the
problems far more extensive. Chile privatized and deregulated its banking and financial system in quick
fashion in the mid-1970s. The privatization program allowed various industrial groups to buy the banks on
credit and the groups then used loans from their own banks to buy other privatized firms (Cortes-Douglas,
1992). This gave rise to large amounts of related lending and violated a basic principle of prudent banking
whereby a bank should not lend to its own shareholders to finance their contribution to the bank's capital. 22
The privatized banks  performed very well during the period of economic expansion that  followed the
economic liberalization and macroeconomic reform policies of the 1970s. But they were also increasingly
involved in  lending  to  related  firms for  spcculative ventures and  the  private  groups  also  borrowed
extensively in dollars. When the exchange rate was devalued and the economy suffered a  big recession,
most private banks were in deep trouble and the authorities intervened and took over 60% of the banking
system at a cost of nearly 25% of GDP. After the crisis, the Chilean authorities introduced a very robust
system of prudential regulation and proceeded to  reprivatize the banks, with a  requirement that  part of
future profits would be used to repay the central bank for the capital spent in rescuing the banks.23 At the
22It  is claimed (though no firm evidence is available) that a  similar approach was followed in  the recent
privatization  of Mexican  banks. Allowing  new owners  to borrow  from  the banks  they  buy  contributes  to higher bids
and may thus inflate the prices fetched  by the government  in selling the banks. But it is a policy pregnant with
dangers. It burdens the banks with large amounts of related lending and may require large spreads in order to
recoup  the inflated  prices paid for the banks.
23An important  policy issue concerns  the extent of moral hazard and adverse selection in the Chilean crisis. It
seems that the groups that acquired the banks engaged initially in genuine expansionarv  finance, both for their
groups  and for their other customers.  But when  their groups  faced severe  financial  difficulties,  the banks expanded
their related lending in an effort to save  their groups  and engaged  in bad banking practices,  throwing  good money
16time  of  the  Chilean  banking crisis,  other  Latin American countries,  including Argentina,  Colombia,
Mexico, Uruguay and Venezuela, also faced severe banking problems (World Bank, 1989; Brock, 1992).
Outside Latin America, Turkey experienced a banking crisis in 1982 when several brokers collapsed and
five private banks were rescued at  a  cost equal to 2.5%  of GNP  (World Bank  1989: Ativas  1989). In
Kuwait, because of large losses sustained from speculation in stocks and real estate markets, an estimated
40% of loans were nonperforming in 1986. The government supported the banking system by providing
concessional loans  (Al-Sultan,  1989).  In  several Asian  countries, including  Malaysia  and  Thailand,
financial crises were caused by problems among large numbers of finance companies. These crises were
more easily contained because the affected companies controlled only a small part of the domestic market
(Sheng,  1992). The crisis was  more serious in the  Philippines, where both  private  and  public  banks
experienced large losses between 1981 and  1987. 160 smaller institutions were closed down, while two
large public banks and five private banks were intervened. The public banks were restructured in 1986 and
their bad  assets,  corresponding to  30% of the banking system's assets,  were transferred  to a  separate
agency. Crises of equal severity were experienced by many African countries, even ignoring those which
have been incidental to civil war. Among the larger African countries affected, in addition to the problems
of the franc zone, already discussed above, one may mention the cases of Ghana and Guinea. In Ghana. the
Government-owned development banks suffered from acute currency exposure as a result of onlending the
proceeds of foreign borrowing converted at the official exchange rate on terms that made no  provision
allowance for what was an inevitable maxi-devaluation. Fraud was the cause of the spectacular crisis in
Guinea, where all the major banks were intervened and closed on a single day.
Following these episodes of widespread banking failures, the authorities of many countries took measures
to  create more robust  banking and financial systems. They  revarnped their prudential regulations  and
strengthened both their supervisorv agencies and their crisis resolution mechanisms. Banks were required to
hold more capital, related lending was subject to tighter controls, information disclosure and transparency
were  improved,  and  regulators  were  empowered to  intervene at  an  early  stage.  Several  East  Asian
countries, including Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand, took such measures. In Latin America, Chile and
Colombia took the lead in establishing robust regulatory frameworks and effective supervisorv agencies.
Yet despite the experience of the early to mid-1980s, several developing countries fell victim once more to
banking and financial crises in the early  1990s. In Eastern Europe and (as mentioned) Central Asia, the
governments of most transitional  socialist countries were faced with large  inherited problems.  Despite
rather aggressive privatization programs. the banking systems of most of these countries continued to be
dominated by  state-owned commercial banks that  held large amounts of nonperforming loans to  state-
owned industrial and commercial companies (Borish et al.. 1995, Kiraly 1995). Banks in some countries,
such as Hungary, suffered from the collapse of the Soviet Union and the European economic recession. In
Hungary, several attempts to recapitalize the banks resulted in capital injections totaling almost  10% of
GDP without any clear indication that the banks adopted new management structures that will prevent them
from decimating their new capital in new loan losses to the same old borrowers. In Latin America, new
major crises erupted in Venezuela, Mexico and Argentina. These have been attributed to the lifting of credit
and  interest rate  controls without a  significant strengthening of prudential regulation and  supervision.
after bad (La Cuadra  and Valdes-Prieto,  1992;  Valdes-Prieto,  1994).  In this, they followed  a similar  pattern to that
of Spanish  banks and engaged  in distress  self lending  to delay  impending  insolvencv  (de Juan. 1987).
17Lending to related parties was still a major source of the problems, although macroeconomic shocks were
also to blame, at least in Argentina and Mexico,
2.3  Causes of Banking Crises
What accounts for the widespread, almost worldwide, phenomenon of banking failures and  crises? The
Norwegian authorities have attributed banking crises to  three  factors:  bad  luck,  bad  policies and  bad
banking (Solheim, 1992).
Bad  luck  refers  to  factors  outside  the  control of  policy makers  and  bankers  such  as  a  prolonged
international economic recession, the collapse of a major country or region (such as the disintegration of the
Soviet Union that had  such an adverse economic impact on Finland as well as on  several countries of
Eastern Europe), the collapse of an important market for a commodity-producing  country (such as the large
fall of the oil price in the mid-1980s), or a major natural disaster. Attributing bank failures to bad luck
smacks of blame shifting as prudent policy makers and bankers could make an allowance for unfavorable
external developments and could accordingly adopt more conservative policies. But it may be uneconomic
to provide against the simultaneous occurrence of two or more external shocks. An overcautious policy
would probably have bigger costs  in terms of foregone output and  economic growth. The Scandinavian
approach of intervening after the fact to provide support to the banking system hit by external shocks but to
withdraw such support and aim to recoup its cost once external conditions improve may achieve a better
balance between costs and benefits, although the problem of moral hazard and induced changes in future
behavior may undermine the long-run soundness of this approach.
Bad policies cover failures of economic policy either at the macro level or at the sectoral or micro level.
Thus, most countries that experienced banking failures had engaged in expansionary monetary and fiscal
policies. These generated economic booms that were not sustainable in the longer run. Chile in the late
t970s,  and Mexico and Argentina in both decades, are only the best-known examples of countries which
suffered  from  overvalued  exchange  rates  combined with  excessive  expansion  of  both  business  and
household lending. These involved asset-based bank lending that contributed to asset price inflation. Even
when not accompanied by macroeconomic booms, the maintenance and subsequent collapse of unrealistic
exchange rates  has been at the root of the many bank failures.  Unsustainable fiscal policies which may
contribute to unsustainable lending booms by encouraging indebtedness by businesses and households. For
example, high  marginal  rates  of  income taxation  combined with tax  exemption  of mortgage  interest
stimulate household borrowing. The problem was aggravated in several countries (Sweden and the United
Kingdom) where changes in fiscal policy and the tax treatment of mortgage interest were announced long
before they  became effective and  they thus  provided a  temporary,  but disastrous,  boost  to  mortgage
demand.
Bad policies at the micro level include the failure to strengthen supervisorv agencies and create mechanisms
for dealing with problem loans and imminent bank failures. In the US, the thrift debacle was precipitated by
cuts in supervisory staff and failure to perceive the growing problems of related lending and abuse  of the
new business powers that were granted to savings and loan associations in the early  1980s. In developing
countries many failires  resulted from reliance on politicallv or socially motivated directed credit from
development  banks to state enterprises or priority sectors, where grants would have been more appropriate.
Poor  financial  discipline  also  contributed,  including undue  forbearance  where  timely  intervention in
troubled banks would have been more appropriate.
18* Finally, bad banking refers to the behavior of banks in the new liberalized markets. Bad banking may be
subdivided  into  three  categories:  imprudent  lending; abusive  self  lending; and  fraudulent  behavior.
Imprudent lending seems to have afflicted all countries with banking problems. It is often associated with a
"herd  instinct"  and  negative  externalities.  It  is  generally  argued  that  banks  have  a  comparative
informational advantage in analyzing and screening potential borrowers and in assessing the prospects of
the projects they finance. But this advantage seems to evaporate under competitive pressures.  Individual
banks fail to take into account the effect on total market prospects of their own lending decisions. Thus,
negative externalities seem eventually to prevail. Banks almost everywhere succumbed to the lure of real
estate finance and the presumed safety of collateralized lending. And they failed to take full account of the
effects of assct price  inflation on the economic feasibility of the financed projects. Bankers involved in
making lending decisions seem to  have explicitly or implicitly assumed that  increases in land or house
prices would continue unabated even though they may have been rising at an abnormally high pace.
Such  collective incompetence and  limited institutional memory is difficult to explain outside a  dynamic
model that  exerts systemic pressures  on bank loan  officers to  adopt optimistic assessments during the
expansion phase of an economic cycle and thus charge low risk premia to be followed by very pessimistic
reactions during the economic downturn when risk premia may be raised to unjustifiably high levels. Thus,
bankers succumbing to  systemic market pressures mav be exaggerating the business cycle. Some banks
resist the temptation and  avoid suffering large  losses but they  are clearly unable to  stem the wave of
euphoria.24
Abusive self lending involving lending to related companies either at preferential terns  and conditions or
even worse when the prospects of those companies are very poor is another manifestation of bad banking.
Thus,  banks  in  Chile, Venezuela, Colombia,  Mexico,  Spain,  Turkey  and  Greece abused  on  several
occasions the trust of their customers and provided excessive loans to related companies. Controlling self
lending and ensuring that it does not exceed levels that are compatible with prudential norms and is not
extended at below market terms and conditions is a major challenge for regulators and supervisors in all
countries. It  is,  however, interesting that  related lending is  less of  a  problem  among  large  banks  in
developed countries. In  these countries, self lending seems to  occur  either  in marginal institutions  or
through finance companies that raise their funds from commercial banks but are not properly monitored
and scrutinized in how they utilize these funds. Lending through uncontrolled finance companies was a big
problem in Sweden and, especially, in Japan during the  1980s. Related lending also gives rise to a moral
hazard problem as banks with substantial amounts of self lending  tend to throw good money after bad when
the performance and prospects of related companies suffer sudden and substantial deterioration. Spain in
the late 1970s and Chile in the early 1980s are the best known examples of this phenomenon.
Outright fraudulent behavior is probably less important as a source of failure than  other forms of bad
banking. Nevertheless,  it often causes  failure among small banks;  in  large banks  isolated frauds  may
generate big losses without resulting in the collapse of the whole bank. Fraud rarely brings down a large
24Imprudent lending often also involves a  relaxation of Icnding criteria and collateral requirements and  an
expansion  in new markets. especially  in foreign countries,  where foreign banks may lack the very comparative
informational  advantages  that they are supposed  to have.
19segment of the banking system (though it did in Guinea), but it may contribute to  bank  failures in an
environment of bad policies and other types of bad banking.
The episodes of banking crises ma'  also be attributed to an inadequate understanding of the implications of
liberalization  and  of the  much higher risks  inherent  in  a  liberalized environment. As  already  noted,
extensive regulations weakened incentives to  build up  the required credit  skills and to  accumulate the
necessary  information capital for  appraising credit applications.  They also delayed the  development of
systems for monitoring and managing credit and price (market) risks. To that  extent, a  leaming process
may be under way which implies that the incidence of bank failures should decline in the future.
Certainly  bankers  are  now  more aware  of the  risks  involved and  are  likely to  adapt  their  behavior
accordingly. There is also greater awareness among both policymakers and practitioners that bad  policy
may undermine good banking, while bad banking may subvert good policy. More emphasis is being placed
around  the world on  the benefits of pursuing  sound macropolicies and  on  maintaining macrostability.
Furthermore, several countries (notablv Chile, Colombia and Malaysia among developing countries, and
the  United  States,  the  United  Kingdom, and  the  Scandinavian countries)  have  created  more  robust
regulatory frameworks and have empowered their supervisory agencies to intervene at an earlier stage in
the unraveling of a bank failure.
But cases such as the United Kingdom, the United States and Spain among OECD countries and Argentina
and  Venezuela among developing countries, where basic mistakes have been repeated once institutional
memories have faded, suggest that the learning process at the level of individual institutions mav be rather
weak. As for the lessons learned by policy makers and bank supervisors, the new more robust approaches
are quite recent and have not been tested yet. Indeed,  there are many commentators who argue that the new
robust frameworks are aimed at fighting the last war and that future banking problems will most likely
arise from new areas.
203.  NETWORKS AND BANKING
Summary of the network argument
Disillusionment with the performance of interventionist policies, and a degree of alarm at the consequences
of deregulation, leaves the debate on optimal banking regulation wide open. Moving beyond the  IIF of
Section 2 brings us  into disputed territory. The search for guiding principles has led to an explosion of
theoretical work on various aspects of the micro-foundations of banking and finance. Though it is too early
for a synthesis of this work, a feature that has proved important in several disparate areas, and which may
have some broad policy implications, is that models of banking and finance have begun to stress network
characteristics.
A network can be thought of as a set of interconnected paths; it is the structured interconnectedness of
economic relationships that we wish to convev by the term. In the economic context the paths typically link
agents and offer  a  more effective or less costly way of  communicating than  simple bilateral  trade.  A
different type of network, the neural network, is also relevant to information and learning problems. A body
of mathematical and statistical theory is devoted to various issues in different types of network (cf., for
example, Bamdorff-Nielsen et al.,  1993). Some of the networks studied by applied mathematicians have
economic relevance, as with electrical, telecommunications and transport networks. And there  are many
economic analyses of particular types of network, as well as a growving  number of applications of results
from the related theory of complex systems.  25  But, given the diversity of these applications, there does not
appear to be an organized economic  theory of networks as such.
Even in the absence of such a theory it appears that most economic policy issues surrounding networks
relate to three recurrent characteristics of many networks. namely, externalities, structural redundancy and
complexity. First, because of externalities to which they are prone, unregulated networks are likely not to
achieve Pareto optimality. Second, network structures can be robust to the failure of one node or segment:
alternative  (redundant)  paths  through  the  netwvork are  available.  Third,  the  complexity  of  the
interconnections are  such that  intervening in one area will typically produce far-reaching  and hard-to-
predict  effects  elsewhere  as  the  network  adapts  to  a  new  equilibrium  configuration.  The  three
considerations pull in opposite directions: although networks are not fragile, the pervasive externalities do
call for intervention, but the complexity makes successful intervention  hard to design.
The potential applicability to banking should be evident. For example, on the one hand, the system is prone
to contagion through depositor runs, suggesting the need for prudential regulation. On the other hand, large
and famous banks  can and  do fail without disastrous economic collapse. Furthermore, the externalities
involved make it well nigh impossible to design policies that will align the incentives of bank management
and ownership with social welfare.
It  is not our  intention to  develop a  network  theory of banking as  such, but  rather  to  employ it as  a
metaphor, concentrating on policy implications of network externalities, redundancy, and complex adaptive
behavior. This policy discussion is resumed in Section 4, but to justify the approach, the remainder of this
section looks more closely at  the various wavs  in which the  recent theoretical literature  has identified
25Liebowitz  and Margolis (1994) show how the concept  of a network  externality,  i.e. one which depends on the
number  of other participants,  can be misused.  See  also Baumol  and Sidak  (1994),  Katz and Shapiro  (1994).
21network characteristics in banking and finance. The examples come from each of the classic aspects of
banking: payments, liquidity and credit.
Network externalities in the payments system
That network externalities are prevalent at the heart of the payment mechanism has often been noted in the
literature. The conventional explanation for why money dominates barter is based on  such externalities
(Ostroy, 1973, Williamson and Wright,  1994), and the same idea recurs in policy-oriented contexts, such
as the analysis of optimal currency areas.26 Externalities also arise in modern payment systems networks
linking banks  in clearing  and  settling different types  of payment  instruments. These externalities  can
provide those banks that have access to the wholesale payments network or to check clearing systems with
market power, and regulators are often called upon to ensure access for others who might be excluded. As
with  the  telecommunications network,  if  the  externalities  entailed  in  payment  networks  cannot  be
adequately internalized by private institutions, they could generate the need for price or access regulation,
though this is arguably of greater significance in respect of the wholesale, or inter-institutional, payments
system than for retail transactions (Saloner and Shepard, 1992).
The competitive and regulatory implications of ATM networks provide an interesting illustration. A recent
study by Matutes and Padilla (1994) presents a model which describes the dilemma of banks considering
whether to join their ATM network with that of competitors. Having a compatible network enhances the
product the bank can offer to potential depositors, who will benefit from enhanced network externalities,
but (for the same reason) this compatibility risks eroding the bank's market power. Both the decision to join
and the related pricing decisions need to take account of the network aspects. There are clearly potential
public policy issues here in computing optimal access prices for ATMs.  Similar issues arise with credit
cards, seen as a means of payment.
Network externalities in liquidity
Network effects in liquidity are most evident in the stock exchange and other organized exchanges such as
those for conmmodities,  futures and options. So far as bank liquidity is concerned, network effects are at
play at  both micro and macro level. A subtle micro-argument implying negative network externalities in
liquidity has been suggested in recent theoretical work by Matutes and Vives (1992) and Yanelle (1989).
They point out that, since the attraction to a depositor of a particular bank depends on the number of its
other depositors (after all, size implies stability and liquidity), large but othervise  inefficient banks may
prevail in the market.
At the macro or system level an extensive literature (following the original work of Diamond and Dybvig,
1983) explains that  a  network externality is at  the heart  of that  regulator's  nightmare, the  bank  run.
According to the literature, early deposit withdrawals by some customers from a bank which has tied up its
resources in illiquid loans may lead to collapse. The externality derives from the fact that my deposit would
26  Cf  Dowd and Greenawav  (1994) who argue that membership  of a currency  union will be more attractive the
more  participants  it has
22be safe if most other depositors left their money in, but all deposits will be at risk if some withdraw. The
bank run extemality forms the center of one argument for deposit insurance. 27
The credit network
Credit too involves a network: the web of inter-related credit arrangements between different agents has
substantial potential for externalities of the network type  28. Credit information exchanges, consumer credit
bureaux and the like29  work well only if most suppliers participate. Other externalities arise in the credit
network, though not all of them are strictly "network externalities" in the usual sense of depending on the
number of participants.
Gale (1993) points out the "lemons"-type feature in lending decisions where each bank is faced with a pool
of applicants some of whom have been turned down by other banks  in the network.  Faced with  such
adverse selection, the individual bank will be fearing the "winner's curse". The bank's confidence that it is
making a profitable  lending decision can thereby be undermined. 30 Unless each banker's own  screening
ability is good enough to outweigh the risk of suffering from the winner's curse, the impact on the volume
of credit  could theoretically be  very severe. 31 Where inforrnation is  scarce  and  mostly  private,  as  in
developing economies, the adverse selection argument is likely to assume relatively greater importance, thus
inhibiting the growth of intermediation.
Traditional populist concerns about concentration of economic power in banks can be reinterpreted in terms
of their role in another network: namely that of corporate control. A recent theoretical literature emphasizes
the manner in which debt contracts  increasingly govern the transfer of  control over poorly-performning
corporations.3233  Bank credit plays a central role here: both in regard to transfer of control over existing
27  Dewatripont  and Tirole (1994)  do not, as is usual, rely on the bank run as the main  justification  for prudential
regulation:  instead they see the authorities  as representing  the interests  of small depositors,  thereby  avoiding  costly
duplication  of monitoring  activities  that would  othervise have  to be carried  out by the depositors.
28Mention  may also be made of the early paper by Thore (1969) on credit networks.  He analysed  the impact of
money  expansion  on the pattern of credit flows  through  different  financial  institutions.
29For  instance, similar organizations  operated  for non-life insurance.  The same applies to the multiple listing
services  used in the US to buy  and sell houses.
30  In game-theoretic  terms, this is an instance  of coordination  failure  in the presence  of strategic  complementarity.
31  This network effect is independent  of other arguments, based on  informational  asymmetries  in  the credit
market that prevent the banking system  from lending enough (or occasionally  induce it to lend too much) to
achieve  a social  optimum  (cf. for example,  de Meza and Webb,  1990).
32  Because  of the agency  problems  entailed  by the extension  of credit, credit contracts  specify  the circumstances
under  which control will pass from the entrepreneur.  These contracts  are designed  to help align the interests  of the
borrower with that of the lender. For instance, a feature of the standard bond contract is that it removes  of any
incentive  for the entrepreneur  to conceal  the true value  of the firm.  Only if the value of the pledged  firm truly falls
23productive resources, and because access by entrepreneurs to control of additional resources is dependent
on their ability to obtain credit. In terms of the network metaphor, banks act as hubs which are on the
preferred routes for much of the pattern of control over productive resources in the economy.34,35
Neural networks in credit
Neural networks are rather different in character to the networks we have been considering up to now. but
they  also  have  clear  relevance.  Finance,  and  especially  banking,  demonstrates  neural  network
characteristics  in that  repeated interactions between participants, or repeated use of nodes, helps build
information capital  (Cf  Shubik,  1990). Repeated  interactions can  also  (through  the  development of
reputation effects) reduce the importance of market imperfections  relating to opportunistic behavior.
But we  should not assume that neural  network-type learning clearly leads to an  optimal allocation of
loanable funds. Statisticians discuss both trained and untrained neural networks (cf  Murtagh,  1994). The
former have a preset criterion function for reinforcing successful or preferred paths. This is the technique
most commonly used when a neural network approach to non-linear data-fitting is being employed (cf
Granger,  1991).36 Other  netwvorks  are untrained and their method for inducing preferred paths evolves
endogenously. Both forms of learning are imperfect. The interaction between borrowers and the banking
system may be more similar to the untrained type of neural network than to the trained.
The banker ty-pically  uses fairly crude decision-rules in deciding whether or not to grant  a credit. These
rules will are revised, but the criterion for revision is their success in inducing a favorable result for the
bank. As the banker's objective function will not usually correspond closely to that of the economy as a
below  the cost of repaying  the bond  will the entrepreneur  default (Diamond,  1984). Other more subtle mismatches
between  the objective  functions  of entrepreneur  and investor  lead to more  complex  financial  contracts.  in which the
circumstances  under which transfer of control will occur is a key element (Aghion  and Bolton, 1992, Hart and
Moore, 1994).
3  Bolton and Thadden  (1995) present  a model  in which the positive  network  externalities  in liquidity  associated
with dispersed  firm ownership  have to be traded-off  against the reduced  effectiveness  of corporate  control when
ownership  is dispersed.
34  The variety of debt contracts  used by financial intermediaries  in these control relationships - the financial
instruments - may be seen as analogous  to alternative modes in a transportation network. Many specialized
financial  intermediaries  are involved  in only  a limited range of modes,  but the trend to deregulation  has meant that
it is increasingly  banks which are closest  to offering a full range of modes,  thereby acting as full hubs in the
network.
35The incentive for bankers to distort or collapse this network structure through concealed self-lending is an
important  potential  source  of social  inefficiency  typically  manifested  through  bank failure.
36The most extensive  use of neural network  techniques  in finance has not been in to understand  the functioning  of
financial  systems,  but in a (much-hyped)  attempt  to improve  financial  asset price forecasts.  There might, however,
be a link between  these two.
24whole 37 the decision-rules that are being reinforced will not necessarily be those which maximize economic
welfare over time.
In simple situations this  mav not matter much, but where such features as  externalities and  increasing
returns are quantitatively important, initial conditions can strongly influence the evolution of the economy
(Arthur,  1989). These initial conditions can include the stock of creditworthiness, and how it is distributed
among potential borrowers. By relying on tried and trusted credit paths the banking system may be locking
the economy into an inferior growth path.
No-one  has  yet  carried  out much  formal analysis  of how  the  evolution of  economies  might  depend
38 sensitively on initial conditions as a result of the credit network.  But such dependence is likely to become
a widely discussed link between the new theories of endogenous growth and policy analysis of institutions.
It could, for instance, enrich the theoretical basis for the empirical links between financial institutions and
growth discussed by King and Levine (1993a,b), and perhaps help to explain their results.
Redundancy and complex adaptation
Examples from finance can also be provided for the other two characteristics which we have highlighted for
networks, namely redundancy and complex adaptation.
For redundancy, the arbitrage possibilities underlying covered interest parity would be an example in the
payments area. The availability of liability management as an  alternative to  asset sales  for generating
liquidity also  illustrates  redundancy. Redundancy is  so  familiar  in the  credit  market  that  we  have  a
neologism for its most common manifestation: "disintermediation".
Complex adaptation
The pavments systems of  Ghana and  Liberia around  1990 provide an  interesting example of sharply
divergent evolutions, as Ghana had no coins, but Liberia had no banknotes. This curious contrast was the
outcome  of  fiscal  pressures  in  both  countries  impacting subtly  different  regulatory  and  institutional
structures in the two countries (Honohan, 1993).
The scale of the US stock market collapse of October 1987 reflects a leverage induced by the unraveling of
a network of linkages put in place by market participants to provide liquidity. In this case a rather modest
initial disturbance was greatly magnified as an over-burdened liquidity network attempted to readjust.
Credit markets also have the potential for multiple equilibria, and to respond to changed circumstances in
unpredicted  ways.  Surely  the  best-studied example  of  complex  adaptation  to  policy  change  under
conditions  of  structured  interconnectedness here  is  the  US  savings  and  loan  collapse,  where  the
37Especially  if the bank is relying on debt contracts  whose  payoff  to the bank is a strictly convex  function of the
economic  benefits  of the activity  being financed.
38 This can be seen as an instance  of complex  adaptive  behaviour  of the system.
25metamorphosis of a large segment of the system following a number of shocks was clearly contingent on a
set of interlocking mechanisms and contractual links (including deposit insurance).
Less dramatic examples can be found in the corporate control network:
The unanticipated emergence and dominant role of investment funds in the Czech experiment with
voucher privatization. Although no  particular role had  been officially envisaged for  investment
funds  in  that  process,  private  operators  took  advantage  of  the  opportunities that  presented
themselves.
The unexpectedly key role of the mandatory pension funds in Chile, resulting from their large
collective holdings mainly of privatized utilities.
In Russia, another type of corporate control structure appears to be emerging with a small number
of large banks "managing" significant segments of industry that they do not "own". 39
Whatever the merits of these developments, the implication is clear: unanticipated innovation can change
the financial environment dramatically.
Some uses of the network metaphor
The usefulness of modeling the financial system as a network lies in two different dimensions. Not only is it
needed in formal modeling to  capture important structural features that  are essential to  aspects of  the
financial system but (less formally), it also suggests certain analogies from the evolution of other networks
that may prove  relevant in looking to the future of the financial system and the likely path  of optimal
policy.
We have already mentioned three areas of direct relevance:
Network extemalities create the potential for allocative inefficiency, potentially corrected through
regulation or sometimes through an appropriate assignment of ownership.
The issue of redundancy. typically inherent in the network structure  itself, with multiple paths
available. Redundancy is crucial for the effective functioning of some networks, such as electrical
power transmission, where it is essential to avoid system failure, but costly or impossible to ensure
absolute reliability of hubs or paths.
The complex adaptive nature of optimal network structure: disturbances  propagate through the
system in ways that are hard to predict. For example, the emergence of new modes or changes in
the volume of demand may alter the equilibrium flow through existing paths in surprising ways, as
with the emergence of the hub-and-spoke system of air transportation in the US in response to
39These three cases have features in common with the situation in South Africa, where two large insurance
companies own strategic holdings, and appoint managers, but allow them considerable  operational freedom
provided some financial objectives  are met. This in turn is similar to the behaviour of conglomerates  such as
Hanson  and BTR in the UK.
26availability of wide-bodied aircraft.  Policy intervention is likely to  be  rewarded with  similarly
unpredictable responses.
A curious feature of the Internet provides a  further analogy, the relevance of which to  finance may be
debated, namely the fact that the US government agency which initiated the Internet and provided its basic
infrastructure  is  no  longer needed for  the  satisfactory  operation of  the  Internet.  and  has,  reportedly,
withdrawn from this provision.
There may also be something to be learnt from the literature on the incentives for technological innovation
under  conditions of network  externalities: the theory predicts that  sometimes a  desirable innovation is
inhibited, but sometimes too a bandwagon sweeps a technology into operation beyond its social desirability.
The network metaphor, and in particular the concept of the neural network, thus has implications for the
evolution of the  structure  of the  financial system and  for  the  design of optimal  financial  policy and
regulation. For instance, new types of financial institutions are created to fill perceived gaps in the financial
system. The gaps may be caused by regulation or by neglect by existing institutions. The new institutions
provide new  paths  bypassing  defective or blocked  paths.  Similarly,  financial  policy  responds to  the
emerging new institutions and new practices and regulation is amended to strengthen or unblock existing
paths or to support the development  of the new paths. Of course, regulators may try to block the new paths
but in the longer run this may turn  out to be futile as private agents always succeed in bypassing the
restrictive effects of regulation, perhaps by moving offshore.
274.  OPTIMAL FEASIBLE REGULATION
As financial systems evolve in complexity and  sophistication, so the policy issues increase in subtlety.
Governments are concerned not only with avoiding bank failures, especially when it is the taxpayer  on
whom most of the incidence of losses falls, but also with ensuring that their financial system is effective in
providing financing for growth as well as ensuring an adequate access to loanable funds and other financial
services for disadvantaged regions and ethnic or other groups. They want to go  well beyond the IIF of
Section I in order to improve performance, whether in terms of safety, effectiveness or fairness.
We have seen that dissatisfaction with the performance of the heavy-handed regulation of the early post-
war years was followed by a process of de-regulation which has in turn been followed by a wave of costly
bank failures. While talk of re-regulation is tempered by an awareness that technological changes make a
simple reversal  impossible, there  is dissatisfaction  with the  performance of  the  existing  regime. The
industrial world is pre-occupied with avoiding failure, but issues of effectiveness and fairness (which are
relatively more pressing in the transition economies and in the developing world) also belong to the policy
debate. But  there is no agreement on  the correct approach or even on what policy can realistically be
expected to achieve.
Should policy move in the direction of increasing refinement, or should policy-makers be seeking a simple,
robust approach? The message of the previous section seem on balance to favor the latter approach. The
netwvork  externalities of many different types which increasingly prevail in the financial system certainly
imply static  market failures  and an a priori  case  for  intervention. But by  the  same token the limited
effectiveness of intervention, the ease with which controls can be by-passed, and the difficulty of assessing
the full system-wide consequences of many plausible interventions imply the desirability of using a  light
hand in adding to the basic institutional infrastructure which has been advocated in the earlier sections.
The messages from the network perspective highlight the trade-off that exists between different objectives
as well as the risk that well-intentioned measures may misfire. Some distortions of economic power and
sporadic bank failures may be prices that have to paid in order to allow the system to finance unpredictable
growvth-oriented  financing needs and to evolve necessary institutional innovations. The history of financial
regulation suggests a degree of policy modesty.
4.1  Policy for safe and sound banking
The conventional wisdom and some proposed refinements
There  is  an  accepted  core  of  wisdom  concerning  the  essential  design  features  of  the  "financial
constitution" 40 underlying prudential regulation for the modern financial system. The aim is to apply  a
stable, liberal regulatory environment, create a contestable market with free qualified entry and exit, and
ensure appropriate incentives for efficiency and  innovation. Such a constitution does not place arbitrary
entry, branching and merger restrictions; but it does require risk diversification (including limits on lending
to  related parties  and  on  large  exposures) and  the accumulation of  capital reserves  to absorb  losses.
40Cf Vittas (1992c).  In essence,  this can be seen as a fleshing  out of aspects  of the IIF of Section  I above.
28Appropriate prudential norms to ensure adequate risk-based capital backing and effective internal systems
of risk management and control are mandated. Can one do better than this by going further in regulation?
We have shown that a kind of contagious euphoria has frequently preceded banking crises. This looks like
another network externality, this time negative, and the corrective policy known as "speed limits" that has
been proposed to prevent overlending during the euphoric phase of the economic cycle, makes sense in
those terms. These would be limits on the growth rate of asset accumulation by financial institutions. The
limits could be linked to each institution's capital position allowing more rapid growth for those whose
capital allowed them to assume the greater risk that is inevitably associated with rapid growth. As the limits
wvould  only bite during occasional spurts of rapid expansion, their static distortions would be moderate, and
it would not be as easy for the financial network to by-pass them as it does permanent restrictions.
Mandatory portfolio limits designed to ensure adequate diversification can also be viewed as an attempt to
ensure that particular institutions are adequately linked to the financial netwvork  and are thereby benefiting
from its risk-sharing capacity. Once again these limits can be related to an institution's capital base.41
The historical context of different financial systems may also create the need for policy  action not so
evidently required in some of the more sophisticated economies. For example, the history of abuse of the
financial system by  powerful economic groups  in  Mexico and  Latin America  suggests that  anti-trust
legislation might be useful in these countries. Yet, in more advanced countries where market information is
more widely available, anti-trust legislation mav not be required.
Increasingly elaborate regulatory rules on  capital adequacy have been proposed (beyond those already
adopted) both in terms of the calculation of risk-weightings (including new attempts to  cope with the
various risks associated with derivatives) and in terms of varying the capitalization requirements over time,
depending for example on the state of the macroeconomv. 42 Although highly complex regulatory rules may
demonstrably improve incentives in a worked out model of a single bank's behavior, they may fall foul of
the  complex adaptive pattern of the financial network as a  whole. In the  present  state of knowledge,
network considerations would argue for caution in over-complicating the rules. After all, it is much easier
to identifv and unwind the unintended system consequences  of simple regulatory rules.
As an altemative  to increasing the complexity of regulation and the burden of supervision, some have
suggested making failure more costly for the management and shareholders of the banks themselves. For
example, recognizing that those who control profitable banks holding a valuable franchise will tend to be
prudent  in order to  avoid loss of the franchise, some authors  have considered models which call  for
preferential tax treatment or subsidies for banks. Other models generate the conclusion that restrictions on
entry or branching (for example), though resulting in monopoly profits, can pay for themselves in terms of
improved credit allocation and a reduced risk of failure (cf Gorton, 1994).
41For  a brief discussion  of this approach.  see Vittas (1992b).  The usc of growth  and portfolio  limits is also briefly
discussed  in Litan (1992).
42Dewatripont  and Tirole (1994) is a sophisticated  analysis  of such a framework.
29But  since widespread bank  crises  are  often associated with the  negative externalities created  through
overlending  and  optimistic  assumptions  during  the  euphoric  expansion  phase  of  a  cycle  and  the
underlending and pessimistic outlook during the  dysphoric contraction phase,  then  we may  have  some
doubt that franchise value will do the trick. Limiting the number of banks does not appear to have sheltered
countries with highly concentrated banking markets from the excesses of the bank lending cycle. For one
thing,  if banks  remain aloof, finance companies and  other types of financial institutions may  become
involved and may propel the expansion phase with both imprudent and abusive self lending. And if finance
companies are not allowed to emerge, then the nonfinancial companies themselves may expand their trade
credit and other forms of lending directly to other businesses or households. Commercial paper and other
securitized markets may  also emerge to provide the finance that is demanded by  an expansion-minded
economy but is not provided by the financial sector.
Limiting entry into banking in an attempt to increase its franchise value will also militate against innovation
and technological progress as new banks are definitelv more likely to adopt new practices,  new products
and new technologies than old banks. By freezing the network, entry limitations stultify it.
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Besides, translating theoretical predictions into practical  recommendations requires an awareness of the
political economy dimensions of the issue. However subtle the rationale for their introduction, tax breaks,
subsidies or other advantages for banks may well open the door to crude distortions achieved by  special
interest lobbyists. This is usually observed when attempts are made to protect a  sector from competitive
pressures. As a result, the general presumption against such privileges seems hard to overturn.4
Limits  to supervision
It is one thing to introduce regulations, another to supervise the performance and solvency of the regulated
institutions. One must be realistic about the inforrmation  and expertise available to regulators. 45 Network
43As well  as increasing  systemic  fragility  (see  below).
440n  the other hand, arguments  for financial  repression  as a useful source  of government  revenue  are likely to be
substantially  weakened by the progressive  improvements  in the administrative  effectiveness  of more efficient
means  of taxation,  such as the value-added  tax and PAYE  income  tax.
45Recall  also that reliance  on prudential  regulation  assumes  the availability  of a skilled,  impartial  and authoritative
official supervision  agency, something  that is not always  easy to provide. It is not hard to be convinced  of the
practical relevance  (where  regulators  lack experience  or authority)  of such problems  as theoretically  illustrated by
Boot and Thakor  (1993).  Their model  describes  an imperfect  regulator  reacting  to new information  which suggests
that an earlier regulatory  judgment  was too lax, and that bank management  is assuming too much risk. Because
corrective  action now will expose  the rcgulator's  earlier error of judgment,  the regulator  too becomes  caught up in
the risk-taking,  and gambles, along with the management.  on the success  of the risky strategy which alone will
enable  the regulatory  error to be concealed.
Besides, heavy reliance  on regulation  has the cffect  of retaining in the system  a scope for corruption  which can
drastically  worsen  economic  performance.  Adapting  Shleifer  and Vishny's  (1993) model  to bank regulation,  we can
picture a corrupt regulator  turning a blind eve to optimistic  loan classification,  or tolerating excessive  lending to
related parties, in return for a side-payment  (e.g. a low interest loan). The lowering  of prudential standards  will
spread throughout the system, encouraging a  socially excessive level of risk-taking with adverse budgetary
consequences  when implicit  or explicit  deposit  insurance  kicks in.
30considerations greatly  complicate their  lives. The  blurring  of  boundaries between  banking and  other
financial institutions is a key factor here, and not only because the associated decline in bank profitability46
increases their vulnerability, as witness a general tendencv to decline in their credit-ratings  . The erosion
of boundaries goes hand and hand with an increase in network interdependencies affecting banlks.
One aspect of this is the growing importance for banks of the management of portfolios for which market
price  risk  (interest  rate,  stock price  or exchange rate changes) are  more important  than  credit  risk. 48
Bandwagon effects in these speculative markets probably increase the instabilitv of interest rates and asset
prices,  and thereby of other macroeconomic conditions. This  in turn feeds back  on the vulnerability of
banks.
More generally, because of the much wider variety of contingencies  which can have a material effect on the
solvency of banks, it is harder to assess the capacity of each bank to face future risks. When banks were
conducting a traditional bills, loans and deposits business, application of simple ratios gave a pretty good
assessment of the health of the bank, at least when combined with a qualitative assessment of the probity
and general administrative and managerial competence  of the principals. Nowadays. with highly leveraged
and  frequently-traded contingent assets  and  liabilities  in the  picture  (including open-ended  insurance
commitments, securities undervritten,  and  a  range of mathematical derivatives 49)  not to  speak  of  the
uncertainties entailed by counterpartv risk (including that generated by reinsurance contracts which may be
repudiated in bad times), maintaining an up-to-date evaluation of solvency seems well-nigh impossible. 50
This is true for the bank's own management, and doubly so for the supervisor especially when, as in many
cases the bank's management sets out to deceive the supervisor.
Furthermore,  the  complex  ow-nership structures  characteristic  of  a  re-emerging breed  of  financial
conglomerates may  serve to conceal not only potential conflicts of interest, but also  the true  leverage
involved, for example where inter-group loans or guarantees are present. The apparent  exposure (in the
Barings case) of owners of mutual fund units to the collapse of a banking affiliate of the fund manager is
just  one  example  of  the  inadequacy of  "firewalls" apparently  built  into conglomcrate  structures  (cf
46With  traditional  core banking  activities  opened  to new competitors.
47Which in turn reduces  their capacity  to intermediate  at the top end of the market. Market segmentation  and the
high credit rating of banks in the industrial  countries  derived  from the old regulatory  regime  which is now being
progressively  dismantled.  Note however  that, despite  all the changes,  line of business  and ownership  restrictions  do
remain  important  in most industrial  countries  (Borio  and Filosa,  1994).
48Securitization  of bank loans has contributed  to this process,  and has been part of the wider process  of unbundling
and repackaging  assets  into derivative  securities.
49Designed  to exploit  and harness  market  risk.
50In fairness, and while supervision  will never be able to provide  early warning of all failures, it is arguable that
the major technological  leaps in the area of derivative instruments  are already behind us and that prudential
technology  now has a chance to catch up. In particular,  the mathematical  complexity  of compound derivatives
should not be beyond  the mastery  of government  regulators.
31Corrigan, 1987). These are instances of the complexity characteristics we have already noted for networks.
It is hard for the supervisor to predict how a particular disturbance might impact the equilibrium structure,
and ultimately the solvency, of an elaborate network, whether that be a  single financial conglomerate, or
several interacting conglomerates.
Of course, network redundancy is also relevant here. Regulatory arbitrage becomes virtually uncontrollable
when the dividing line between regulated banks and unregulated non-banks no  longer clearly delineates
financial products which are close substitutes. Attempts to regulate or re-regulate a particular instrument or
activity often result merely in the emergence of a close substitute provided by a  nonbank. perhaps with
explicit or implicit ownership links with the bank.
Acceptable risk offailure
If the elaboration of the banking network has so complicated supervision we may have to conclude that
banking failures cannot be avoided. This would also seem to be the message from history. Indeed, bearing
in mind that banking houses have been prone to collapse throughout the centuries since the Bardi and the
Medici financed trade and the extravagances of princes, what strikes one again and again on reading the
history of bygone eras is the structural similarity between the characteristic causes of bank failure in what
would appear on a superficial examination to be widely differing circumstances. Internal fraud, foolish and
incautious staff in remote offices, allowing one's portfolio to become too heavily leveraged with respect to
the macroeconomic conjuncture, and the occasional spectacular confidence trick have all been present in
each of the past seven centuries. Some new elements do emerge: the "too big to fail" doctrine has, perhaps,
only been  with us  since the nineteenth century,  but before then there  was a  "too big to  be  stopped"
svndrome. Likewise the altered incentive stnictures provided by  implicit and, especially explicit, deposit
insurance seem essentially new.
Although financial crises and collapses cannot be entirely avoided, we will argue that it is also true that
most bank failures are absorbed reasonablyf  smoothly, largely because of the network redundancy of which
we have spoken.
Of course bank failures have distributional effects, but how substantial are the systemic costs which they
impose on society? 51 There are historical events to which one could point as illustrations of very severe
consequences. Many of these occurred against a background of macroeconomic policy failure or of adverse
external non-financial shocks, and  could be  seen themselves as  consequences rather  than  independent
causes of widespread distress. Besides, the bulk of instances of bank failure are not of that character. In
particular,  while the deposit contract is theoretically prone to runs by uninformed depositors at times of
heightened uncertainty caused by a bank failure, the frequency of such contagion effects is not high (Selgin
and White, 1994). Besides, they usually affect only a part of the banking system and for a short time, and
they have usually been offset by the interbank market or by the central bank.
Even where a large part of the banking system has become insolvent, the position has usually been met by
government subsidy with only limited deadweight losses. Even the savings and loan crisis in the USA, the
largest collective financial sector failure to date, did not exceed the capacity and willingness of the US
51Admittedlv,  as mentioned earlier, there is a presumption  that bank failure reflects misallocation  of loanable
funds. But it does not follow  that the funds of solvent  banks  have always  been put the best social  use.
32federal government to bail out depositors, although it did exacerbate the fiscal deficit, and in the long-term
will have led to higher tax rates. The same is true of the substantial bank failures in Scandinavia, Spain and
France in recent years.
Are the checks and balances that are built into the system such as to cause bank crises to burst before they
get too large to be dealt with, or are unmanageable banking crises simply inherently rare? 52
It does seem that the finance network contains sufficient redundancy to continue to function despite isolated
failures. Ensuring this capacity, rather than attempting to forestall all possible bank failures may be the key
to feasible bank regulation. The implications for competition policy here clearly conflict with the idea of
ensuring a franchise value for banks, mentioned above. While the latter is seen inter alia as being required
to prevent excessive risk taking, it could be counterproductive if pursued to the point where it leads to just
a few institutions handling the whole of a relatively closed and fragile system.
If the consequences of bank failure are primarily distributional in nature, often spread  widely through
taxation, and if they do not result in catastrophic disruption to the operation of the financial system or of
the economy, then it is possible to take a more relaxed view of bank failure than is customary. From this
perspective, one may think  of the  regulatory system as a  mechanism for  limiting the  exposure of  the
taxpayer  to  risk. At  some price, bank failure  becomes an acceptable risk  (cf  Caprio,  1994). Ex post
corrective action can be less costly than excessive ex ante preventative measures.
As will be clear from earlier sections, that is all very far from suggesting that  no regulatory structure is
necessary, though some authors have explored this opposite extreme, namely the removal of all regulatory
constraints and the operation of "free banking". The main arguments in favor of "free banking" are that the
rule of caveat emptor is a  reliable way of inducing prudent investor and banker behavior, and that the
introduction of  regulation and  depositor protection weakens these incentives, and  may  introduce other
distortions. The experience of 18th Century Scotland is often quoted as a successful example, though it is
clear that it was a market which comprised a small elite of business-people most of whom were mutually
acquainted. The applicability of the example to the current environment is doubtful: information flows are
much improved now, but the market participants are much more diverse (cf. Caprio and Vittas,  1995).
It is worth mentioning that the arguments of theoreticians in favor of the need for regulation are different to
those of policymakers. Theoreticians point to various reasons why market-failure will prevail in financial
markets even with rational agents; policy-makers  worry about  the potential losses to  gullible investors.
Unattractive though the policymakers' perception may be to the theoretician, it is undoubtedly important in
practice. Gullibility comes from lack of experience, and much behavior in the financial system is based on
reputation and experience with well-tried contracts and practices. Even if the "free bankers" were right in
an equilibrium of rational investors thev must surely be wrong in a transitional phase.
52Thus  we note that the Barings collapse  occurred  at a stage when the losses were no larger than the sum of the
shareholders'  (and subordinated  bondholders')  funds plus the estimated  present  value of the firm's future earning
possibilities.  In this case, therefore,  despite inadequate  internal  controls  and an apparently  almost unlimited scope
for losses, given the nature of the transactions  being undertaken  by an inadequately  controlled  official,  the losses
were contained  to what could  be borne by those  who were willing  and able  to bear risks.
33The wave of banking failures which has swept the world in the past decade or so is rightly regarded as the
price which had to be paid for deregulation. While fraud and macroeconomic instability played their part,
in many cases the proximate cause of the failures can be said to have been lack of experience on the part,
either of bankers or their customers, in particular types of contract or transactions. Deregulation altered the
institutional configuration within which the financial network had evolved and (quite apart from the fact
that some regulation continues though in an altered form)  it was not accomplished as  smoothly as the
withdrawal of the government framework on which the Internet was built. Lack of experience of the newly
available territory  - a  form of "gullibility" - inevitably led to problems.  In the  new more  competitive
environment, banks  succumbed more easily to the  systemic pressures  for excessive asset-based finance
during the expansion phase of the cycle. Further liberalization in the future can be expected to have similar
effects - though presumably manifested in somewhat unpredictable ways.
4.2  Policy for effectiveness and fairness
Though most recent attention has focused on the question of limiting bank insolvency, we must not neglect
the other objectives which policy in regard to the control of banking has sought to achieve, mostly falling
into the categories of effectiveness and fairness. Under the heading of effectiveness, we include concern that
the  financial  system  should  provide  adequate  means  of  financing  available  to  ensure  growth  and
development. Countless official reports have bemoaned the lack of term finance. or of finance for  small
enterprises, and argue that development  and growth have been hindered by these shortcomings. Attempts to
limit consumer credit, and to retain national control over finance by limiting foreign ownership, also fall
into the  same category. The arguments that come under the heading of fairness may  overlap  with the
developmental, but  are  typically  couched  in  terms  of  regional  (including urban/rural),  sectoral  and
distributional objectives, avoidance of discrimination on grounds of ethnicity or gender, anti-monopoly and
consumer protection. While these arguments are more often heard in developing countries, they continue to
influence policy to some extent in most industrial countries.
In our discussion of the networks associated with credit (Section 3 above) we have already illustrated the
theoretical validity and potential importance of distortions of some of these types. Although that does not
prove that every suspicion of unfair treatment is well-founded, or that measures to boost bank lending for
small enterprise will represent a  good use  of loanable funds, the path  dependency arguments  and  the
possible non-linearities do  suggest that the marginal benefit from measures that succeed in reducing the
effect of some of these distortions could be very considerable.
Unfortunately, simple administrative mechanisms such as directed credit, 53 interest subsidies and the like
are easily evaded, especially in developing countries.54  Nevertheless,  they continue to be employed and even
newly introduced schemes are to be found in industrial countries. Such schemes are likely to be more
effective when  imposing relatively modest apparent  cost penalties to  banks  and  where  administrative
compliance is more easily monitored.
53Already  discussed  in Section  2 above.
54CfC  World  Bank (1989).
34Apart  from simple mechanisms of this  kind, the effectiveness of the banking system in helping ensure
economic growth may be strongly influenced by structural policies, of which the most widelv discussed is
the question of universal banking.
Universal banking
While there are safety and soundness aspects to  the debate over universal banking, it has mainly been
concerned with two other issues: concentration of power and the overall effectiveness of the banking svstem
in ensuring good use of loanable resources.
The approaches adopted to these questions by scholars have been both theoretical and historical. But the
potential for drawing simple policy conclusions from a historical comparison of the overall perfonnance of
(for example) the German and Japanese financial systems on the one hand (as representative of bank-based
regimes) and the British and UK systems (representing market-based systems) is limited by the complexity
of the differences in institutional and regulatory structure in these various economies.;5 Indeed the very fact
that legislation in both Japan and the US ostensibly separate investment from commercial banking, while
this has not been the case in Germany or the UK, highlights the dangers of jumping to recommendations
(Borio and Filosa, 1994).
Some of the fears of those who criticize universal banking on the basis of the conflicts of interest which it
can entail and the suggestion that  it may increase prudential risks should have been assuaged by  recent
analysis of the US experience both before and after the limitations of the 1930s. Focusing on the suggestion
that universal banks would have taken advantage of gullible clients by selling low-quality bonds on behalf
of firms to which they had outstanding loans, Kroszner and Rajan  (1994) provide convincing evidence
56 against the hypothesis for the 1920s.
Apart from questions of consumer protection and prudential risk, there is the question as to whether banks
or markets provide the best govemance relationships, and make the best decisions as to where credit will
go. A plausible middle ground on this debate holds that for each one there are circumstances in which it
dominates the  other. Thus  a  bank-led system may  be more effective when  information is scarce,  and
potential evaluators few, while the market system mav have merit when information is plentiful. but where
there is scope for divergence of views as to future prospects.57,58
55Allen  and Gale (1995)  provide  an insightfill  discussion  of these issues.
56Benston  (1994)  summarizes  related arguments  in favour  of permitting  universal  banking.
57Or where  personal relationships  between  financier and entrepreneur  could handicap  the downsizing  and closure
decisions  that may  be necessary.
58Recent  developments  in the US and UK suggest  that securities  markets  dominated  by institutional  investors  face
the same  conflicts  of interest and imperatives  in monitoring  corporate  performance  and influencing  governance  as
universal  banks. If so, the differences  may be more  semantic  than substantive.
35A different argument provided in favor of the large, universal bank is that it has the capacity to redistribute
risk between generations in a way which is not available through the securities markets (Allen and Gale,
1995).59  Effectively, the arguments for the big-bank model are arguments that some aspects of the network
should be institutionally internalized. Whether such internalization is likely would depend partly on  the
banks' ability to maintain cost-competitiveness in the business of intermediation, a  matter which will be
influenced by  the  degree to  which cost penalties are  imposed by  regulation, but  will also  depend on
technological and managerial innovation. If banks progressively lose market share of savings to securities
markets,  then  the  potential  borrowers  that  have  no  access  to  securities  markets  (small  enterprises,
households) could experience a worsening terms of trade. There may also be a tendency for geographical
concentration with depositors' funds migrating to major centers more easily than can the borrowers.60
Few can claim that the question: "Do financial systems work better with universal banking?" has  been
adequately resolved. Given the certainty that proscription of universal banking will drive some business
offshore and lead to other evasions, this ignorance makes it hard to advocate such proscription.
59For example, they point out how savers  with German universal  banks have been insulated  from fluctuations  in
the market  value of equity.
60On the other hand, the development  of markets as those for securitized  mortgages  and credit card receivables
may offset  this tendency,  and households  may benefit  from better pricing of risk and other senrices.  Small firms
could also benefit  as banks refocus  their operations  to specialize  in areas where  they have  a comparative  advantage:
i.e.  where  private  information about the  character and  skills of borrowers are  important for  assessing
creditworthiness  and where monitoring  can be combined  with  other  banking senvices.
365  CONCLUSION
Despite the growing complexity of banking and financial systems, there are some unambiguous messages.
For one thing, we have seen that application of a few simple structural rules goes a long way to avoiding
the worst kinds of financial sector failure. That many recent instances of such failure can be documented
shows that this finding is not a vacuous one. Indeed, its implementation  is still the major policy priority in
probably a majority of transition economies,  and is also required elsewhere.
But  banking policy  has  always  been  more  ambitious than  this,  both at  the  macro  and  micro  level.
Dissatisfaction with the diminishing effectiveness of the post-war  regimes of banking regulation led to
substantial deregulation. In its wake came several waves of bank failure and bank crisis, onlv some of
which could be rationalized as the manifestation of previously hidden insolvency. Certainly bankers went
through  a  learning  process  before adjusting to  the  deregulated regime, and  they  seemed  particularly
vulnerable to a form of contagious euphoria, often manifested in overlending to property developers. Given
the recurrence in history of carbon-copy banking failures, however, it is clear that private learning will not
go so far as to eliminate all bank failure.
The design of optimal policy, not only for achieving safety, but also for ensuring the effectiveness of the
banking system, and an equitable share in its services for all sections of the community, is still a major
policy concern. But the disappointing performance of both the regulated regime and the deregulated leaves
a certain vacuum, which theoreticians have been trying to fill. A feature of many theoretical studies of
banking is the recurrence of the concept of a network to describe either the system as a whole, or aspects of
it.  Among the  characteristics  of many networks are their proneness  to  externalities, their  redundancy
(ensuring that  flows cannot be obstructed by  blocking just  one path)  and their tendency to  adapt  in  a
complex  manner  to  disturbances.  Taken  together,  such  characteristics  can  on  the  one  hand  justify
regulation, but on the other hand point also to the likely ineffectiveness of much regulatory effort, and to
the unpredictability of the system's response to regulatory measures.
Applying this  perspective to  current policy issues leads us  to suggest a  degree of modesty in banking
policy. A basic regulatory framework is certainly needed to reduce the incidence of bank failure; we are not
advocating laissez faire.  We  emphasize measures to  ensure  risk  diversification and  adequate capital
reserves. We even allow for growth and portfolio limits, linked to capital resources, on the grounds that
such controls are institution-neutral and will not be as readily undermined  by network effects as other types
of regulation. But we argue that both over-elaborate regulation, and the alternative of increasing franchise
value (through limited entry or othervise)  fall foul of netvork-based critiques. We are against restrictions
on  branching,  mergers  and  business  powers,  against  elaborate  capital  requirements (too  difficult  to
calculate and  verify), against  entry restrictions to  increase franchise value and  against proscription of
universal banking (because no conclusive case has been made against it).
Supervision has a role in verifying the presence of effective internal information and management systems
and in early intervention to avoid the heavv costs of forbearance. However, the blurring of boundaries
between banking and the remainder of the financial network has placed an upper-bound to the effectiveness
of supervision. We will have to put up with bank failures (mitigated by deposit insurance to protect small
savers) and indeed we argue that - partly because of network redundancy - the social costs of bank failure
are not as high as is sometimes  thought.
37Many of the other commonly discussed policy objectives, mostly relating to the dynamic effectiveness of
the  banking system and  to  issues of faimess,  can be  rationalized in terms  of  correcting for  network
extemalities. For example, the universal bank can be seen as a way of intemalizing a whole segment of the
financial network in a single institution. The appropriate role of policy here depends crucially on correct
specification of the model; when the relevant networks have complex adaptive characteristics the  wrong
model can give very misleading results.
While the forces of redundancy, as exemplified by regulatory arbitrage, militate against subsidy or directed
credit  solutions  to  problems  of  faimess,  network  ideas  suggest  that  the  marginal  impact  of  small
interventions here can be so large as to justify the distortions involved.
38REFERENCES
Aghion, P. and P. Bolton (1992), "An Incomplete  Contracts Approach to Financial Contracting", Review of
Economic Studies, 59, 473-494.
Allen, F.  and  D.  Gale  (1995),  "A  Welfare  Comparison of  Intermediaries and  Financial  Markets  in
Germany and the US", European Economic Review, 39, 179-2  10.
Al-Sultan, F.H. (1989), Averting Financial Crisis.  The Case of Kuwait, World Bank, Background Paper
for 1989 World Development Report, Washington D.C.
Antoniades, D. and  D.  Kouzionis (1989), Financial  Distress of Industrial  Firms  in  Greece and  their
Impact  on  the  Greek Banking  System, World Bank,  Background Paper  for  1989 World Development
Report, Washington D.C.
Arthur,  B. (1989),  "Competing Technologies, Increasing  Retums,  and  Lock-in  by  Historical  Events:,
Economic Journal, 99, 116-13 1.
Atiyas, I. (1989), The Private Sector's Response to Financial Liberalization in  Turkey: 1980-82. World
Bank, PPR Working Paper  147.
Bamdorff-Nielsen, O.E., J.L. Jensen, and W.S.Kendall, eds. (1993), Networks and Chaos: Statistical and
Probabilistic Aspects, (London: Chapman and Hall).
Baumol, W.J.  and  J.G.  Sidak (1994),  "The Pricing of Inputs  Sold to  Competitors",  Yale Journal  on
Regulation,  11, 171-202.
Benston, G.J. (1994), "Universal Banking",  Journal of Economic Perspectives, 8, 121-45.
Bergl6f, E. and E.-L. von Thadden (1994), "Short-Term versus Long-Term Interests: Capital  Structure
with Multiple Investors", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 1055-1084.
Bolton, P.  and  E.-L. von Thadden (1995),  "The Ownership Structure of  Firms: The Liquidity-Control
Tradeoff in the Privately Held Firm", Presented at  the World Congress of the  International Economic
Association, Tunis.
Boot, A.W.  and A.V.  Thakor  (1993),  "Self-Interested Bank Regulation", American  Economic  Review
Papers and Proceedings, 83, 206-212.
Boot,  A.W.,  S.I.  Greenbaum  and  A.V.  Thakor  (1993),  "Reputation  and  Discretion  in  Financial
Contracting", American Economic Review, 83, 1165-1183.
Borio, C.E.V. and R. Filosa (1994), "The Changing Borders of Banking: Trends and Implications", BIS
Economic Papers, No. 43. Bank for International Settlements, Basle.
39Borish, M.S., M.F. Long and M. Noel (1995), Restructuring Banks and Enterprises: Recent Lessons from
Transition Countries. (Washington, D.C.: World Bank) Discussion Paper 279.
Brock, P.L. (ed.) (1992a), If Texas Were Chile: A Primer on Banking Reform, (San Francisco, CA: ICS
Press).
Brock, P.L. (1992b), "Introduction" in Brock (1992a).
Calomiris, C.W. and  C.P.  Himmelberg (1995), "Government Credit Policy and Industrial Performance:
Japanese Machine Tool Producers, 1963-91". World Bank Policv Research Paper No. 1434.
Caminal, R., J. Gual and X. Vives (1990), "Competition  in Spanish Banking" in J. Dermine (ed.) European
Banking in the 1990s, (Oxford: Basil Blackwell).
Caprio,  J.G..  Jr.,  (1994),  "Bank  Regulation:  The  Casc  of  the  Missing  Model",  Presented  to  the
Brookings/KPMG Conference on the Sequencing of Financial Reforms.
Caprio, J.G.,  Jr.,  D. Folkerts-Landau and T.  Lane, eds. (1994), Building  Sound  Finance  in Emerging
Market Economies, (Washington, D.C.: IMF).
Caprio,  J.G.,  Jr.  and  D. Vittas  (1995), Financial  History:  Lessons  of the  Past for  Reformers  of  the
Present,  World  Bank Policy Research Working Paper  1535 (Forthcoming in Caprio  and  Vittas,  eds,
Reforming Finance: Some Lessons from History).
Conti,  V.  and  R.  Hamaui  eds.  (1993),  Financial  Markets'  Liberalization  and  the  Role  of  Banks,
(Cambridge University Press).
Cortes-Douglas, H. (1992), "Financial Reform in Chile: Lessons in Regulation and Deregulation" in Vittas
(1992a).
Davis,  E.P.  (1994),  "Banking, Corporate  Finance, and  Monetary  Policy: An  Empirical  Perspective",
Oxford Review of Economic Policy,  10 (4), 34-49.
de  Juan,  A.  (1987), "From  Good Bankers to  Bad  Bankers: Ineffective Supervision and  Management
Distortions as Major Elements in Banking Crises". World Bank, Financial Policy and Systems Division,
mimeo.
de la Cuadra, S. and S. Valdes-Prieto (1992), "Myths and Facts about Financial Liberalization in Chile,
1974-1983" in Brock (1992a).
de Meza,  D. and  D. Webb  (1990),  "Risk, Adverse Selection and  Capital  Market  Failure", Economic
Journal,  100, 206-214.
Dewatripont, M. and J. Tirole (1994), The Prudential Regulation of Banks, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press).
40Diamond,  D.W.  (1984),  "Financial Intermediation and  Delegated Monitoring", Review  of  Economic
Studies, 51, 393-414.
Diamond, D.W.  and  P.H.  Dybvig (1983),  "Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance  and  Liquidity", Journal  of
Political Economy, 91, 401-419.
Dowd, K. and D. Greenaway (1994), "Network Extemalities and Switching Costs: Towards an Alternative
View of Optimum Currency Areas", Economic Journal,  103, 1180-1189.
Gale, D. (1993), "Information Capacity and Financial Collapse", in Mayer and Vives, eds (1993).
Goodhart, C.A.E. (1987), The Evolution of Central Banks: A Natural Development?  (Cambridge, MA,
MIT Press).
Gorton, G. (1994), "Bank Regulation When 'Banks' and 'Banking' Are Not the Same", Oxford Review of
Economic Policy,  10 (4), 106-119.
Granger,  C.W.J.  (1991), "Developments in the Nonlinear Analysis of Economic Series", Scandinavian
Journal of Economics, 93, 263-276.
Grosfeld, I. (1994), "Financial Systems in Transition: Is There a Case for a Bank Based System?" CEPR
Discussion Paper No. 1062.
Hart,  0.  and  J.  Moore (1994),  "A Theory  of  Debt  Based on  the  Inalienabilitv of  Human  Capital",
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 109, 841-880.
Hellwig, M.F.  (1994), "Banking and Finance at  the end of the Twentieth Century", WWZ  Discussion
Papers No. 9426, University of Basel.
Honohan, P. (1993), "Financial Sector Failures in Western Africa", Journal of Modern African Studies, 31
(1), 49-65.
Johnston, R.B. (1994), "The Speed of Financial Sector Reform: Risks and Strategies", IMF PPAA 94/26.
Kane, E.J. (1985), The Gathering Crisis in Federal Deposit Insurance, (Cambridge, Mass., MIT Press).
Kane, E.J. (1989), The S&L Insurance Mess: How Did It Happen? (Washington, D.C., Urban Institute
Press).
Katz. M.L.  and C. Shapiro (1994), "Systems Competition and Network Effects", Journal  of Economic
Perspectives, 8, 93-115.
Kay, J. (1991), "The Economics of Mutuality". Annals of Public and Cooperative Economy, 62, 309-318.
King, R.G. and R. Levine (1993a), "Financial Intermediation and Economic Development", in Mayer and
Vives, eds (1993).
41King, R.G. and R. Levine (1993b), "Finance and Growth: Schumpeter Might Be Right", Quarterly Journal
of Economics,  108, 717-738.
Kiraly,  J.  (1995),  "Permanent Banking Crisis?  Central  and  Eastern  European  Banking  in  the  90s",
Presented at the World Congress of the International Economic Association, Tunis.
Koskenkyla, H. (1994), "The Nordic Banking Crisis", Bank of Finland Bulletin, August.
Kroszner, R.S. and R.G. Rajan (1994), "Is the Glass-Steagal Act Justified? A Study of the U.S. Experience
with Universal Banking before 1933", American Economic Review, 84, 810-33
Liebowitz, S.J. and S.E. Margolis (1994), "Network Externalities: An Uncommon Tragedy", Journal of
Economic Perspectives, 8, 133-150.
Litan,  R.E.  (1992),  "Banks and  Real Estate: Regulating the  Unholy Alliance", in L.E.  Brown and  E.
Rosenberg, eds., Real Estate and the Credit Crunch, Federal Reserve Bank of Boston, Conference Series
No. 36.
Matutes,  C. and  A.J.  Padilla  (1994), "Shared  ATM Networks  and  Banking  Competition", European
Economic Review, 38, 1113-1138.
Matutes C. and X. Vives (1992), "Competition for Deposits, Risk of Failure and Regulation in Banking",
ESF Network in Financial Markets Working Paper.
Mayer,  C.P.  (1994), "The Assessment: Money and Banking: Theory and Evidence", Oxford Review  of
Economic Policy,  10 (4), 1-14.
Mayer, C.P. and X. Vives eds. (1993), Capital Markets and Financial Integration, (Cambridge University
Press).
Montes-Negret, F. (1989). "The Decline and Recovery of Colombia's Banking System: 1982-87", World
Bank, Washington D.C, mimeo.
Murtagh.  F. (1994), "Neural Networks and Related 'Massively Parallel' Methods for  Statistics: A Short
Overview", International Statistical Review, 62, 275-288.
Ostrov, J.M., (1973), "The Informational Efficiency of Monetary Exchange",  American Economic Review,
63, 597-610.
Pohl, G.  and S.  Claessens (1994), "Banks, Capital Markets  and Corporate  Governance: Lessons from
Russia and Eastern Europe", The World Bank PRE Working Paper 1326.
Renaud, B. (1995), "The  1985-1994 Global  Real Estate  Cycle: Its  Causes and  Consequences", World
Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 1452.
42Saloner, G. and A. Shepard (1992), "The Adoption of Technologies with Network Effects: An Empirical
Examination of the Adoption of Automated Teller Machines", NBER Working Paper 4048.
Selgin, G.A.  and  L.H.  White  (1994),  "How  Would the  Invisible Hand  Handle  Money". Journal  of
Economic Literature, 32, 17  18-1949.
Sheng, A. (1992), "Bank Restructuring in Malaysia: 1985-88" in Vittas (1992a).
Shleifer A. and R.W. Vishny (1993), "Corruption", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 108, 681-716.
Shubik, M. (1990), "A Game Theoretic Approach to the Theory of Money and Financial Institutions", in
B.J. Friedman and F.H. Hahn, eds., Handbook of Monetarv Economics, I (Amsterdam: North Holland).
Solheim, J. A. (1992), "The Nonvegian Experience with Financial Liberalization and Banking Problems" in
Vittas (1992a).
Stiglitz,  J.E.  (1993),  "Financial  Systems for  Eastern  Europe's  Emerging Democracies", International
Center for  Economic Growth, Occasional Paper No. 38.
Thore, S. (1969), "Credit Networks", Economica  (36), 42-57.
Valdes-Prieto, S. (1994), "Financial Liberalization  and the Capital Account: Chile, 1974-84" in Caprio et al.
(1994).
Vittas, D. ed. (1992a), Financial Regulation. Changing the Rules of the Game, EDI Development Studies,
(Washington  D.C.: World Bank).
Vittas, D. (1992b),  "Introduction  and Overview"  in Vittas (1992a).
Vittas, D. (1992c), "The  Impact  of Regulation  on Financial  Intermediation"  in Vittas (I992a).
Vittas, D. and Y.J. Cho (1995). "Credit Policies:  Lessons from East Asia". World Bank Policy Research Paper
No. 1458.
White, L.J. (1991), The S&L Debacle. Public Policy Lessons for Bank and Thrift Regulation, (New York:
Oxford University  Press).
Williamson, S. and R. Wright (1994), "Barter and Monetary  Exchange Under Private Information",  American
Economic Review, 84, 104-123.
World Bank (1989), World Development Report,  1989. Financial Systems and Development. (Washington,
D.C.: World Bank).
Yanelle, M.O. (1989), "The Strategic  Analysis  of Intermediation",  European Economic  Review, 33, 294-304.
43Policy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1611  Economic Analysis for Health  Jeffrey S  Hammer  May 1996  C  Bernardo
Projects  37699
WPS1612  Stock Market and Investment  The  Cherian Samuel  May 1996  C  Samuel
Signaling Role of the Market  30802
WPS1613  Does Public Capital Crown Out  Luis Serven  May 1996  E  Khine
Private Capital? Evidence from India  37471
WPS1614  Growth, Globalization, and Gains  1Thomnas  W  Hertel  May 1996  A  Kitson-Walters
from the Uruguay Round  Christian F  Bach  323947
Betina Dimaranan
Will  Martin
WPS1615  Issues in Measuring and Modeling  Martin Ravallion  June 1996  P  Sader
Poverty  33902
WPS1616  Transient Poverty in Rural China  Jyotsna Jalan  June 1996  P  Sader
Martin Ravallion  33902
WPS1617  Why is Unemployment Lcw in the  Simon Commander  June 1996  L  Alsegaf
Former Soviet Union? Enterprise  Andrei Tolstopiatenko  36442
Restructuring and the Structure
of Compensation
WPS1618  Analytical Aspects of the Debt  Stijn Claessens  June 1996  R. Velasquez
Problems of Heavily Indebted  Enrica Detragiache  39290
Poor Countries  Ravi Kanbur
Peter Wickham
WPS1619  Capital Flows to Latin America  Sara Calvo  June 1996  M  Gomez
Is There Evidence of Contagion  Carmen Reinhart  38451
Effects?
WPS1620  Bank Insolvencies: Cross-country  Gerard Caprno,  Jr.  July 1996  B.  Moore
Experience  38526
WPS1621  The Sustainability of African Debt  Dariel  Cohen  July 1996  S  King-Watson
33730
WPS1622  Capital Control Liberalization and  Ross Levine  July 196  P  Sintim-Aboagye
Stock Market Development  Sara Zervos  38526
WPS1623  Environmental Degradation and  Deon Filmer  July 1996  S  Fallon
the Demand for Children: Searching  Lant Pritchett  38009
for the Vicious Circle
WPS1624  Structural Adjustment, Ownership  Luca Barbone  July 1996  C  Pelegrin
Transformation, and Size in Polish  Domenico Marchetti, Jr  85067
Industry  Stefano PaternostroPolicy Research Working Paper Series
Contact
Title  Author  Date  for paper
WPS1625  Restructuring and Taxation in  Simon Commander  July 1996  L. Alsegaf
Transition  Economies  Andrei Tolstopiatenko  36442
WPS1626  Partners or Predators? The Impact  Jeffrey D. Lewis  July 1996  N. Mensah
of Regional Trade Liberalization on  Sherman Robinson  Q4-058
Indonesia
WPS1627  Tradable Water  Rights: A Property  Paul Holden  July 1996  P  Mendez
Rights Approach to Resolving Water  Mateen Thobani  38893
Shortages and Promoting Investment
WPS1628  Globalization: A New Role for  Shigeru Otsubo  July 1996  J  Queen
Developing Countries in an Integrating  33740
World
WPS1629  Form of Ownership and Financial  Fabio Schiantarelli  July 1996  P. Sintim-Aboagye
Constraints  Alessandro Sembenelli  38526
WPS1630  Water Pollution Abatement by  Susmita Dasgupta  August 1996  S. Dasgupta
Chinese Industry: Cost Estimates  Maiinul Huq  32679
and Policy Implications  David Wheeler
Chonghua Zhang
WPS1631  Bank Regulation and the Network  Patrick Honohan  August 1996  P. Infante
Paradigm: Policy Implications for  Dimitri Vittas  37642
Developing and Transition Economies